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IN RE WENDLAND: CONTRADICTION, 
CONFUSION, AND CONSTITUTIONALITY 
Mary Ann Buckley* 
This is the hardest case.1 
INTRODUCTION 
The issue of medical treatment refusals for incompetent 
patients is a relatively recent phenomenon, primarily due to 
advances in medical treatment and technology that provide the 
capability to support biologic life, if not necessarily cognitive 
life, in circumstances that would have been impossible until 
recently.2 
In In re Wendland, the California Supreme Court held that a 
conservator may not withhold artificial nutrition and hydration 
from a minimally conscious patient in the absence of clear and 
convincing evidence either that the patient had previously 
expressed wishes to forgo such treatment or that doing so is in 
                                                          
 *R.N.; Brooklyn Law School Class of 2003; M.A. University of 
Virginia, 1995; B.A. St. Mary’s College of Maryland, 1986; A.A.S. 
Piedmont Virginia Community College, 1980. The author extends her heartfelt 
thanks to Rachel Wrightson, George Barry and Erin O’Connor for their 
invaluable editorial comments, and to Professor Marsha Garrison for her 
guidance.  
1 In re Wendland, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 550, 553 (Ct. App. 2000). 
2 Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990); see 
also Ronald E. Cranford, Modern Technology and the Care of the Dying, in 
BIRTH TO DEATH: SCIENCE AND BIOETHICS 191-97 (David C. Thomasma & 
Thomasine Kushner eds., 1996) (exploring changes in the process of dying 
since the second World War). 
BUCKLEYMACRO1-20.DOC 4/1/03 2:43 PM 
256 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
the patient’s best interest.3 With Wendland, California joined a 
small but growing number of states that have adopted the clear 
and convincing standard in these circumstances.4 The Wendland 
court, however, was the first to determine that a lesser standard 
would be unconstitutional.5 Because of the profound effect this 
decision could have on a significant number of health care 
decisions, it is important to examine the court’s reasoning to test 
it for soundness. 
This comment examines Wendland, challenging the court’s 
reasoning. Part I briefly explores case law regarding medical 
treatment refusals and legislative enactments based on the 
Uniform Health Care Decisions Act (UHCDA).6 Part II discusses 
the details of the Wendland case. Part III challenges the court’s 
reasoning, focusing on four problems with the decision: (1) 
Stating that its decision would affect only a “narrow class” of 
patients, the court misperceived the scope of the decision’s 
                                                          
3 28 P.3d 151 (Cal. 2001), reh’g denied, 2001 Cal. LEXIS 6484 (2001). 
“‘Conservator’ means a court-appointed conservator having authority to make 
a health care decision for a patient.” CAL. PROB. CODE § 4613 (Deering 
2001). A “surrogate” is one, other than a patient’s appointed agent or court-
appointed conservator, who is authorized to make decisions for a patient. See, 
e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 4643 (Deering 2001). 
4 Other states include Michigan, In re Martin, 538 N.W.2d 399 (Mich. 
1995); Missouri, Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988), aff’d sub 
nom.  Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); New 
Jersey, In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1109 (N.J. 1985); New York, In re 
Westchester County Med. Ctr. ex rel. O’Connor, 531 N.E.2d 607 (N.Y. 
1988). 
5 See generally Wendland, 28 P.3d 151. The court examined the case in 
the light of Article I, section 1, of the California Constitution, which 
specifically lists privacy as an individual right, and noted that the 
constitutional privacy provision protects against private conduct.  Id. at 165. 
While a full discussion of the issue of the existence of a federal constitutional 
right to privacy is beyond the scope of this article, it is possible that other state 
courts will adopt reasoning from Wendland when construing their own state 
constitutions. It is also conceivable that the court’s reasoning could be 
considered in examining the issue on a federal level. 
6 UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT, 9 U.L.A. pt. I.B, 147-82 (1993) 
[hereinafter UHCDA], available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/fnact99/ 
1990s/uhcda93.htm. 
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applicability;7 (2) while the court’s decision was ostensibly made 
in the spirit of furthering individual autonomy, the opinion 
actually has the opposite effect, since Californians are now either 
forced to make decisions in a manner they would not have chosen 
themselves or suffer the consequences of a default they likely 
would not have chosen themselves;8 (3) the court’s dependence 
on the use of written advance directives is misplaced, as is its 
belief that oral appointment of surrogates adequately offsets the 
consequences of failure to execute written advance directives;9 
and (4) clear and convincing evidence, in contrast to the court’s 
holding, is neither required nor appropriate for decisions to 
withdraw treatment from incompetent patients.10 Part III also 
proposes that the California legislature must now specify that the 
preponderance of the evidence is sufficient for surrogates to 
withdraw treatment from incompetent patients as long as other 
statutory requirements are met. Furthermore, the legislature must 
specify what procedural safeguards are sufficient to resolve 
                                                          
7 Wendland, 28 P.3d at 175. 
8  Id. at 168. 
9  Id. at 160-61, 172. The court relied on the use of advance directives 
and oral appointment of surrogates to provide guidance as to the patient’s 
wishes.  Id. Advance directives are statements made by competent individuals 
directing the kinds of care they would like to receive in the event of their 
subsequent incapacity. See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, 
PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 152 (5th ed. 2001); see also David 
Orentlicher, The Limitations of Legislation, 53 MD. L. REV. 1255, 1258-59 
(1994). Advance directives are governed by state law; California’s governing 
provisions allow for written and oral advance directives and appointment of 
agents and surrogates. See CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 4670, 4711, 4684, 4714 
(West 2003). The United States Congress supported the use of advance 
directives via the Patient Self-Determination Act (PSDA). Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 4206, 104 Stat. 1388, § 
4206 (1990) (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1991)) (including as a budget 
amendment the PSDA, which requires healthcare providers to provide written 
information to patients regarding their right to make advance directives, and to 
provide additional education to staff and the community regarding advance 
directives). 
10 See Wendland, 28 P.3d at 174 (concluding that clear and convincing 
evidence is required to prove that a conservatee either wished to refuse life-
sustaining treatment or that it would be in his best interest). 
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disputes, in order to keep such disputes out of the courts. 
I.  LEGAL BACKGROUND11 
Prior to Wendland, California case law was clear that 
competent patients may refuse life-sustaining treatments, even 
when not terminally ill, based on the California Constitution’s 
Privacy clause.12 Prior to California’s adoption of its version of 
the UHCDA, decisions for incompetent patients were either made 
informally,13 or based on state laws governing advance directives 
and court-appointed convervators.14 After the adoption of the 
Health Care Decisions Act (HCDA), all treatment decisions for 
incompetent patients, regardless of how the decision maker came 
by that role, were to be guided by the same provisions of the 
act.15 
A. California Case Law 
The right of competent persons in California to refuse 
medical treatment was upheld in 1972 in Cobbs v. Grant.16 In 
                                                          
11 See generally Norman L. Cantor, Twenty-Five Years After Quinlan: A 
Review of the Jurisprudence of Death and Dying, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 182 
(2001) (examining case law on the subject of medical treatment refusals more 
comprehensively). 
12 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1. “All people are by nature free and 
independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and 
defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and 
pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.”  Id. See Bouvia v. 
Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 301 (Ct. App. 1984); Bartling v. Superior 
Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Ct. App. 1984). 
13 Health Care Decisions Act: Hearing on A.B. 891 Before the Senate 
Rules Comm., 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. (Cal. Sept. 3, 1999) [hereinafter Senate 
Rules Comm. Hearing on A.B. 891]. 
14  Id. 
15  Id. 
16 502 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1972) (remanding a medical malpractice case for 
retrial on the basis that it was unclear on what theory the jury reached its 
verdict when there was insufficient evidence to show negligence but when it 
was possible that the patient had not given informed consent). 
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Cobbs, the court held that a patient has the right to disclosure of 
his choices in regard to treatment, and the risks inherent in those 
choices.17 The court based that right on the right of the patient to 
refuse treatment.18 The right of competent patients to refuse even 
life-sustaining treatments was subsequently upheld in Bartling v. 
Superior Court in 1984.19 In Bartling, a competent patient was 
being treated with mechanical ventilation due to chronic 
respiratory failure, emphysema, a lung tumor and other serious 
medical problems.20 He sought an injunction to order the hospital 
and his physicians to disconnect the ventilator, but the lower 
court refused, claiming that such treatments could only be 
withdrawn if the patient was comatose and only in the absence of 
a reasonable possibility of recovery.21 The appellate court 
reversed, noting that the right to refuse treatment is an “obvious 
corollary” to the notion expressed in Cobbs that treatment given 
in the absence of informed consent constitutes a battery.22 
The right to refuse feeding and hydration was extended to 
patients who are not terminally ill in Bouvia v. Superior Court of 
Los Angeles County.23 Elizabeth Bouvia was completely immobile 
as a result of cerebral palsy, quadriplegia and arthritis, and was 
dependent on others for all aspects of her care.24 Her physicians 
                                                          
17  Id. at 10. 
18 Id. at 9. 
19 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Ct. App. 1984) (holding that a patient has the right 
to have mechanical ventilation discontinued despite objections of physicians 
and hastening of his death). 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Ct. App. 1986). The right to refuse treatment was 
also held to apply to prisoners in Thor v. Superior Court of Solano County, 
855 P.2d 375 (Cal. 1993) (holding that, in the absence of evidence of a threat 
to institutional security or public safety, an inmate may not be denied the 
freedom to refuse all medical treatment). The Wendland court erred in 
referring to Elizabeth Bouvia as a terminally ill patient; she was paralyzed, 
confined to a wheelchair, and suffering from cerebral palsy, but was not 
terminally-ill. See GREGORY PENCE, CLASSIC CASES IN MEDICAL ETHICS 25, 
29 (1990). 
24 Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 299-300. 
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inserted a feeding tube against her will and she sought an 
injunction requiring that the tube be removed.25 The trial court 
denied her request, but the appellate court granted her relief.26 In 
granting relief, the court relied in part on Cobbs and Bartling.27 
B. Development of Case Law on the Use of the “Clear and 
Convincing” Standard 
Prior to Wendland, courts in Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey 
and New York had adopted the clear and convincing standard for 
refusal of medical treatment by surrogates.28 The United States 
Supreme Court upheld the right of a state to require the standard 
in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health.29 
With In re Conroy, New Jersey became the first state to 
require clear and convincing evidence of a patient’s previously-
stated wishes to refuse medical treatment.30 Claire Conroy was a 
                                                          
25 Id. at 298. 
26 Id. Despite the court’s decision, Ms. Bouvia did not elect to exercise 
the option granted by the court to starve herself. See PENCE, supra note 23, at 
44. 
27 Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 300-02. The court also relied on Barber v. 
Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006 (Ct. App. 
1983) (issuing a writ of prohibition to restrain the lower court from proceeding 
on murder charges filed against physicians who discontinued medical 
treatment from a comatose patient) The Barber court held that the physicians 
had no legal duty to act and that failure to act, therefore, was not grounds for 
proceedings. Id. at 1022. Furthermore, the court found that withdrawal of 
treatment is equivalent to withholding it, id. at 1016, and noted that “a murder 
prosecution is a poor way to design an ethical and moral code for doctors.” Id. 
at 1011. 
28 See In re Martin, 538 N.W.2d 399 (Mich. 1995); Cruzan v. Harmon, 
760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988), aff’d sub nom. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of 
Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1984); In re 
Westchester County Med. Ctr. ex rel. O’Connor, 531 N.E.2d 607 (N.Y. 
1988).  
29 497 U.S. 261 (1990). See infra notes 45-61 and accompanying text 
(discussing the case). 
30 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1984). Courts throughout the United States have 
looked to New Jersey for guidance in cases regarding medical treatment 
refusals, since New Jersey was often the first to confront the issues. See In re 
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terminally-ill, elderly, incompetent patient living in a nursing 
home.31 She had a history of refusing medical care and 
expressing discomfort with hospitals and medical treatment.32 Her 
nephew had sought to withdraw artificial nutrition and 
hydration.33 Despite Ms. Conroy’s death during the course of 
litigation, the New Jersey Supreme Court seized the opportunity 
to attempt to clarify decision-making standards by defining three 
such standards: “subjective,” “limited objective” and “pure 
objective.”34 In an attempt to keep such decisions out of the 
courts, the Conroy court set up procedural methods by which 
such decisions could be made.35 The court rejected distinctions 
between death that results from treatment termination and death 
                                                          
Peter, 529 A.2d 419 (N.J. 1987) (allowing the withdrawal of feeding tube 
from a patient in a persistent vegetative state based on clear and convincing 
evidence of the patient’s wishes for such treatment to be withdrawn); Conroy, 
486 A.2d 1209 (recognizing that the right to refuse treatment survives 
incapacity and prescribing procedural safeguards for patients in nursing 
homes); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976) (allowing withdrawal of 
ventilator treatment from a patient in a persistent vegetative state). New Jersey 
was the first explicitly to find a distinction between suicide and the refusal of 
treatment. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 664 (noting “a real distinction between 
the self-infliction of deadly harm and a self-determination against artificial life 
support or radical surgery, for instance”). See Cantor, supra note 11, at 183 
(reviewing the history of treatment refusal cases). 
 31 Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1216.  
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 1218. 
34 Id. at 1229-33. The court held that the subjective standard could be 
used to refuse treatment on an individual’s behalf when there is clear evidence 
that the individual would have made that choice; the “limited objective” test 
should be used when there is some trustworthy evidence that the individual 
would have wanted to terminate treatment and the burden of prolonging life, 
as a result of pain and suffering, significantly outweighed the benefits of a 
prolonged life; and the “pure objective” test would allow for the termination 
of treatment only when the individual’s physical suffering would make the 
treatment inhumane. Id. at 1231-33. 
35 Id. at 1241-42. The procedures included determination of the 
incompetency of the individual, notification of the Office of the Ombudsman 
(an office designated to investigate allegations of abuse in nursing homes), and 
confirmation by two independent physicians confirming the attending 
physician’s assessment of the patient’s medical condition and prognosis. Id. 
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that results from allowing a person to die of his disease,36 and 
between artificial feeding and other life-sustaining medical 
treatments.37 Subsequently, the New Jersey Supreme Court noted 
that Conroy was limited to elderly, incompetent patients with 
some ability to interact with the environment.38 
Three years later, in In re Westchester County Medical 
Center ex rel. O’Connor, New York became the next to require 
clear and convincing evidence of a patient’s wishes to have 
treatment withdrawn.39 While continuing to recognize the 
individual’s right to refuse treatment, the court refused to allow 
one to make such an assertion for another on the basis that no 
court or other person should decide what is an acceptable quality 
of life for another.40 Over the objections of family members, the 
court allowed the hospital to continue providing artificial feeding 
to Mary O’Connor, who became incompetent after having several 
strokes.41 Here, the court failed to find clear and convincing 
evidence that O’Connor would have chosen to refuse the 
treatment, despite evidence of repeated expressions of her beliefs 
over a period of almost twenty years in response to the deaths of 
a number of her relatives.42 The court defined “clear and 
convincing” as the level of proof sufficient to convince the 
                                                          
36 Id. at 1236 (noting that “[c]haracterizing conduct as active or passive is 
often an elusive notion, even outside the context of medical decision-
making . . . [t]he distinction is particularly nebulous, however, in the context 
of decisions whether to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment”). 
37 Id. at 1234. The court, however, recognized the “emotional 
significance” of food. Id. What the court did not specify was whether it 
considered the emotional significance to be for the individual being fed or for 
those doing the feeding, an important distinction in deciding the benefits and 
burdens for the patient of continuing artificial feeding. See id. 
38 In re Peter, 529 A.2d 419 (N.J. 1987) (refusing to require the tests and 
procedures of Conroy prior to withdrawal of treatment for patients in a 
persistent vegetative state). 
39 531 N.E.2d 607 (N.Y. 1988). 
40 Id. at 613. 
41 Id. at 608. 
42 Id. (noting that O’Connor’s statements were primarily in response to 
deaths from cancer of her husband, stepmother and the “last two” of her nine 
brothers). 
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factfinder “as far as is humanly possible, that the strength of the 
individual’s beliefs and the durability of the individual’s 
commitment to those beliefs makes a recent change of heart 
unlikely.”43 Although the O’Connor court rejected the term 
“substituted judgment,” it utilized what is usually considered a 
substituted judgment standard.44 
Missouri followed New Jersey and New York, requiring the 
clear and convincing standard in Cruzan v. Harmon.45 Nancy 
Beth Cruzan was in a persistent vegetative state (“PVS”) as a 
result of injuries sustained in an automobile accident.46 Here, the 
Supreme Court of Missouri found that evidence of the patient’s 
wishes to have artificial nutrition and hydration withdrawn was 
“inherently unreliable” and refused to authorize her parents to 
have such treatment discontinued.47 The court held that the state’s 
interest in preserving Nancy’s life and that of others like her, in 
the face of a minimal burden on Nancy to continue living, 
outweighed her right to have treatment discontinued.48 
Additionally, the court noted that the issue of such decisions is 
one of policy, which is best left to the legislature, and that 
legislative action would be required in order to overcome the 
                                                          
43 Id. at 613 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
44 Id. 
45 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988). 
46 Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 410-11. Nancy’s parents requested that her 
artificial nutrition and hydration be withdrawn, but the hospital refused to do 
so without court approval. Id. at 268. The trial court authorized the 
termination of treatment but the State Supreme Court reversed, holding that 
the State Constitution—and probably the U.S. Constitution—provided no broad 
right to privacy that would allow for unfettered exercise of a right to refuse 
treatment, that the State had a policy strongly favoring the preservation of life 
and that Cruzan’s statements to her roommate were insufficient to establish her 
wish not to receive treatment under her current circumstances. Id. PVS is a 
state in which the patient has sleep/wake cycles but exhibits no cognitive 
awareness of or substantial reaction to the surroundings. PRINCIPLES OF 
NEUROLOGY 347 (Raymond D. Adams et al. eds., 6th ed. 1997). 
47 Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d. at 426. The trial court found that “Nancy 
expressed, in ‘somewhat serious conversation’ that if sick or injured she would 
not want to continue her life unless she could live ‘halfway normally.’” Id. at 
411. 
48 See id. at 426. 
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current state presumption in favor of life.49 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.50 In its 
subsequent opinion, the Court noted the confusion in the various 
courts over the basis of the right to refuse treatment and the 
appropriate standard to apply in cases involving incompetent 
patients.51 The sole question before the Court was “whether the 
United States Constitution prohibits Missouri from choosing the 
rule of law which it did.”52 In a plurality opinion, the Court held 
that the United States Constitution did not bar a state from 
requiring clear and convincing evidence of an incompetent’s 
wishes.53 The Court also recognized a liberty interest under the 
Due Process Clause for a competent person to refuse unwanted 
medical treatment, and assumed that such right would include the 
refusal of nutrition and hydration.54 Whether such a right has 
been violated must be determined by balancing the individual’s 
liberty interest against the relevant state interests.55 
                                                          
49 See id. Specifically, the court stated, “[I]f there is to be a change 
in . . . policy, it must come from the people through their elected 
representatives.” Id. 
50 Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 492 U.S. 917 (1989). 
51 Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (pointing 
out that the cases on the subject “demonstrate both similarity and diversity in 
their approaches to decision of what all agree is a perplexing question with 
unusually strong moral and ethical overtones”). 
52  Id. at 277. 
53 See id. at 285. The Court did not explicitly state that the standard was 
constitutionally required, but discussed it approvingly. Id. at 283. 
54 See id. at 284. 
55 Id. at 279. The Court held that it was permissible for Missouri to apply 
a clear and convincing evidence standard when the individual interests at stake 
are particularly important. Id. at 283. The Court cited Missouri’s interest as a 
general interest in the protection and preservation of human life; the Court 
stated that Missouri may: 1) seek to “safeguard the personal element of [an 
individual’s] choice” between life and death; 2) guard against “potential 
abuses” by surrogates who may not act to protect the patient;” 3) consider that 
“a judicial proceeding regarding an incompetent’s wishes may very well not 
be an adversarial one, with the added guarantee of accurate factfinding that the 
adversary process brings with it;” and 4) decline “to make judgments about 
the ‘quality’ of life that a particular individual may enjoy, and simply assert an 
unqualified interest in the preservation of human life to be weighed against the 
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Additionally, the Court determined that the Constitution does 
not require a State to accept the substituted judgment of close 
family members without substantial proof that their views reflect 
the patient’s.56 The Court further noted that “favored treatment of 
traditional family relationships . . . may not be turned around 
into a constitutional requirement that a State must recognize” 
such decision making.57 
Justice O’Connor noted in her concurring opinion, however, 
that the plurality decision did not decide whether a State must 
give effect to the decisions of a surrogate.58 She concluded that, 
in order to protect the patient’s liberty interest in refusing 
medical treatment, the State may have a constitutionally required 
duty to do so.59 In a dissenting opinion joined by Justices 
Marshall and Blackmun, Justice Brennan stated that Cruzan had a 
fundamental right to be free of unwanted artificial nutrition and 
hydration that is not outweighed by any interest of the State.60 
The dissenters found that the standard required by Missouri 
impermissibly burdened that right.61 
Michigan was the first state after Cruzan, and the last before 
Wendland, to apply the clear and convincing standard to 
treatment refusals by surrogates.62 In In re Martin, a case 
                                                          
constitutionally protected interests of the individual.” Id. at 281. 
56 See id. at 286. The Court did not discuss what might constitute 
“substantial proof.” See id. 
57 Id. The Court, however, did not disallow states’ recognition of such 
decision making. Id. 
58 Id. at 289 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
59 Id. Justice O’Connor’s suggested means of protecting the liberty 
interest in refusing medical treatment included durable powers of attorney and 
health care proxies, but she did not mention statutory appointment of family 
members or due process procedural safeguards in the absence of any of the 
above. Id. at 290-91. 
60 Id. at 302 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also id. at 350 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (opining that the best interests of the individual should prevail over 
general state policy). 
61 Id. at 302 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that “Nancy Cruzan has a 
fundamental right to be free of unwanted artificial nutrition and hydration, 
which right is not outweighed by any interests of the State”). 
62 In re Martin, 538 N.W.2d 399 (Mich. 1995). 
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remarkably similar factually to the Wendland case, Michael 
Martin suffered head injuries as the result of an accident, leaving 
him severely impaired, both physically and neurologically, 
although he was not in a vegetative state.63 His wife sought to 
discontinue artificial nutrition and hydration based on previous 
statements he had made, but was opposed by his mother and 
sister.64 The Martin court noted that a “necessary corollary of 
the . . . right to consent is the right not to consent.”65 Despite this 
acknowledgement, the court set the burden of proof for refusals 
by surrogates significantly higher than for consent.66 
Thus, by the time the California Supreme Court heard 
Wendland, four states had judicially-mandated standards that 
required clear and convincing evidence of a patient’s previously 
expressed wishes to have treatment withdrawn in circumstances 
                                                          
63 See id. at 402-03. 
64 Id. at 402. In Martin, Michael Martin’s level of functioning may have 
been greater than that of Robert Wendland, and there is some question as to 
the motives of his spouse. See Andrew J. Broder & Ronald E. Cranford, 
“Mary, Mary, Quite Contrary, How Was I to Know?” Michael Martin, 
Absolute Prescience, and the Right to Die in Michigan, 72 U. DET. MERCY L. 
REV. 787 (1995) (describing Michael as “conscious but unable to 
communicate, except through head nods, and even then not in a consistent, 
meaningful manner;” and noting that “Mary consulted with nurses, doctors, 
lawyers, clergy and a bioethics committee regarding the withdrawal of 
Michael’s artificial means of life-support. Through those consultations, Mary 
sought to address all medical, ethical, religious, and legal aspects of the 
decision to withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment from Michael”). Cf. 
John H. Hess, Looking for Traction on the Slippery Slope: A Discussion of the 
Michael Martin Case, 11 ISSUES L. & MED. 105 (1995) (reporting that 
Michael’s abilities included smiling frequently, indicating his desire to 
participate in therapy, using a communication device until Mary transferred 
him to a different facility and enjoying recreational activities; describing 
Mary’s attempts to keep information from other family members; and citing 
others claims that she engaged in extramarital relationships even at the time of 
the court proceedings, that she had financial motives and that she was biased 
against persons with disabilities). 
65 Martin, 538 N.W.2d at 405. 
66 See id. at 407. The court accepted the notion that the right to refuse 
treatment could survive incompetency and be asserted on a person’s behalf, 
but allowed only a purely subjective standard. Id. at 407-08. 
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similar to what the patient was then experiencing.67 The United 
States Supreme Court allowed but did not require that standard in 
order to satisfy constitutional requirements.68 
C. California and the UHCDA 
Legislatures have responded to confusion in the courts by 
enacting legislation regulating advance directives, health care 
powers of attorney and surrogate decision making.69 Every state 
has enacted either a health care power of attorney statute or a 
living will statute.70 Thirty-five states have enacted surrogate 
decision-making statutes of varying degrees of 
comprehensiveness.71 California enacted the HCDA in 1999.72 
                                                          
67 See supra Part I.B (discussing the cases from those four states). 
68 Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). Justice Scalia raised the issue of 
treatment termination as a deliberate means to end life, stating that refusal of 
medical treatment is equivalent to suicide. Id. at 293-99 (Scalia, J., 
concurring). The Court rejected that position in 1997. See Vacco v. Quill, 521 
U.S. 793 (1997). In Vacco, physicians challenged the constitutionality of New 
York statutes criminalizing the act of aiding a person to commit or attempt to 
commit suicide, on the basis that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Constitution. Id. at 798. They argued that since patients on life-sustaining 
treatment could request its discontinuance, knowing it would lead to their 
death, then patients who were not on life-sustaining treatments were thus 
treated differently. Id. Justice Scalia joined without comment in the majority 
opinion that rejected this argument, despite his comment to the contrary in 
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 293-99 (Scalia, J., concurring) (equating decisions to 
refuse treatment with suicide). 
69 See generally Mark Stephen Bishop, Note, Crossing the Decisional 
Abyss: An Evaluation of Surrogate Decision-Making Statutes as a Means of 
Bridging the Gap Between Post-Quinlan Red Tape and the Realization of an 
Incompetent Patient’s Right to Refuse Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment, 7 
ELDER L.J. 153, 155 (1999) (reviewing various legislative enactments 
regulating health care decisions). 
70 Id. at 155 n.4 (citing American Bar Association Commission on Legal 
Problems of the Elderly). 
71 Id. at 155-56, 168-78 (comparing surrogate statutes from Illinois, New 
Mexico and Ohio, as representative of the various types). 
72 1999 Cal. Stat. 658 § 12. 
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1. The UHCDA 
The UHCDA was drafted and approved by the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1993 
and was approved by the American Bar Association in 1994.73 
The purpose of the Act was to achieve more uniformity in 
decision making from state to state, but it has had limited success 
due to the number of states that had previously enacted statutes.74 
The UHCDA has been adopted in some form by six states, 
including California.75 All of the states other than California that 
have adopted the UHCDA include “comprehensive provisions” 
based on the UHCDA for decision making by surrogates.76 
                                                          
73 UHCDA, supra note 6. 
74 David M. English, Note, The Uniform Health Care Decisions Act and 
its Progress in the States, 15 A.B.A. PROB. & PROP. 19-20 (2001) (reviewing 
the utilization of the UHCDA by states). 
75 Id. at 20. The other states are Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, Mississippi, 
and New Mexico. Id. Delaware restricts those eligible to use advance 
directives to patients who are terminally ill or permanently unconscious, and 
both Delaware and Maine restrict withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining 
treatment decisions by surrogates to patients who are terminally ill or 
permanently unconscious. Id. at 20-21. Hawaii prohibits the withdrawing or 
withholding of artificial nutrition and hydration by a surrogate unless two 
physicians certify that the treatment is “merely prolonging the act of dying and 
that the patient is unlikely to have any neurological response.” Id. at 21. 
76 Id. at 20. Delaware provides a list from which a surrogate shall be 
chosen, in descending order of priority: spouse (with some exceptions), adult 
child, parent, adult sibling or adult grandchild. 16 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 
2507 (2001). Hawaii requires a consensus among potential surrogates as to 
who will serve as surrogate, in the absence of which they may seek 
appointment as guardian. HAW. REV. STAT. § 327E-5 (2002). Maine provides 
a list similar to Delaware except that the list includes “an adult who shares an 
emotional, physical and financial relationship with the patient similar to that of 
a spouse” after spouse in priority, and adds at the end of the list adult nieces 
or nephews, adult aunts or uncles, and “another adult relative of the patient, 
related by blood or adoption, who is familiar with the patient’s personal values 
and is reasonably available for consultation.” ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, 
§ 5-805 (West 2001). Mississippi also provides a list of surrogates similar to 
Delaware but without grandchildren. MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-211 (2001). 
New Mexico also provides a list of surrogates similar to Delaware, except but 
New Mexico also provides for significant others after spouses, and substitutes 
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2. California’s Adoption of the UHCDA 
Prior to adopting a version of the UHCDA, California 
provided no formal rules for making decisions regarding medical 
treatment of incapacitated individuals.77 California adopted the 
Act to create uniform rules and standards for medical decision 
making for incapacitated persons so the same rules apply 
regardless of how the decision maker was chosen.78 California’s 
law does not include the UHCDA’s hierarchical ordering of 
family members for surrogate decision making when 
incapacitated patients have not named a health care proxy or 
surrogate, but does specify that domestic partners have the same 
rights as spouses to make medical decisions.79 California included 
provisions allowing for oral advance directives and oral 
appointment of surrogates, unlike some other states that have 
                                                          
grandparents for adult grandchildren. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7A-5 (Michie 
2002). 
77  Senate Rules Committee Hearing on A.B. 891, supra note 13. 
78 Id. According to the California Law Commission, the impetus for the 
law was a series of cases in which decisions had been made for patients by 
providers either using or disregarding guidance from surrogates or family 
members. Health Care Decisions Act: Hearing on A.B. 891 Before the Senate 
Judiciary Comm., 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999) (hereinafter Senate 
Judiciary Comm. Hearing on A.B. 891). The cited cases included Duarte v. 
Chino Comm. Hosp., 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 521 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding that since 
health care providers are immune from damages from failure to comply with 
advance directives they are therefore also immune when there is no directive); 
Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (Ct. App. 1983) (finding that 
failure to provide medical treatment when the patient has no chance of 
recovery is not an unlawful failure to perform a legal duty); and Cobbs v. 
Grant, 502 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1972) (finding that physicians have a duty of 
reasonable disclosure of available choices of medical therapies and the dangers 
both potential to as well as inherent in each choice, i.e., a duty of informed 
consent). The rules were intended to apply equally whether the surrogate is a 
family member or friend, a surrogate named in an advance directive, a public 
guardian, or a court “making health care decisions as a last resort.” Senate 
Judiciary Comm. Hearing on A.B. 891, supra. 
79 CAL. PROB. CODE § 4716(a) (Deering 2001). See UHCDA § 5, supra 
note 6, at 167-68. 
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adopted the UHCDA.80 California also limited oral designation of 
a surrogate to the course of treatment, illness or other health care 
institution stay during which the designation was made.81 
3. California Probate Code Section 2355 
California adopted the HCDA in 1999, four months after the 
appellate court filed its decision in Wendland and before the 
California Supreme Court heard the case.82 The HCDA amended 
section 2355 of the California Probate Code, governing decisions 
by conservators.83 
                                                          
80 Delaware omitted the provision recognizing oral instructions, and both 
Maine and New Mexico provided additional safeguards. See English, supra 
note 74, at 20. 
81 Id. at 23. The act was subsequently amended to limit the authority of 
orally appointed surrogates to “the course of treatment or illness or during the 
stay in the health care institution when the surrogate decision is made, or for 
60 days, whichever period is shorter.” CAL. PROB. CODE § 4711(b) (West 
2003). 
82 1999 Cal. Stat. 658 § 12. The HCDA became effective July 1, 2000;  
the appellate court had filed its decision on February 24, 2000. Wendland, 93 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 550 (Ct. App. 2000). 
83 CAL. PROB. CODE § 2355 (Deering 2001). From the time of its 
enactment in 1979 to the effective date of its amendment in 2000, section 
2355(a) provided: 
If the conservatee has been adjudicated to lack the capacity to give 
informed consent for medical treatment, the conservator has the 
exclusive authority to give consent for such medical treatment to be 
performed on the conservatee as the conservator in good faith based 
on medical advice determines to be necessary and the conservator 
may require the conservatee to receive such medical treatment, 
whether or not the conservatee objects. 
CAL. PROB. CODE, § 2355(a) (West 1998) (amended 1999), quoted in 
Wendland, 28 P.3d at 163. After amendment, section 2355 provided: 
If the conservatee has been adjudicated to lack the capacity to make 
health care decisions, the conservator has the exclusive authority to 
make health care decisions for the conservatee that the conservator in 
good faith based on medical advice determines to be necessary. The 
conservator shall make health care decisions for the conservatee in 
accordance with the conservatee’s individual health care instructions, 
if any, and other wishes to the extent known to the conservator. 
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a. Section 2355 Prior to the HCDA 
Prior to its amendment, section 2355 included no language 
regarding the applicability of informal statements made by the 
conservatee while competent.84 In In re Drabick,85 the California 
Court of Appeal accepted that the former section 2355 allowed a 
conservator to withhold artificial nutrition and hydration from a 
patient in PVS and interpreted section 2355 as restricting the role 
of courts in supervising conservators’ treatment decisions.86 The 
Drabick court also accepted that the conservator would be bound 
by the conservatee’s formal health care directions, but rejected 
the idea that a conservator would be bound to honor prior 
informal statements regarding continuation or cessation of 
treatment.87 Finally, the Drabick court concluded that the 
decision would be based on the conservator’s assessment of the 
conservatee’s best interests, while considering the conservatee’s 
prior statements as relevant and worthy of consideration in good 
faith.88 
Thus, as originally enacted, section 2355 provided that a 
conservator must follow the dictates of an advance directive, but 
made no provision for utilization of informal statements as to the 
patient’s wishes. After Drabick, conservators could utilize 
informal statements in determining a patient’s best interests but 
were not required to do so. 
                                                          
Otherwise, the conservator shall make the decision in accordance 
with the conservator’s determination of the conservatee’s best 
interest. In determining the conservatee’s best interest, the 
conservator shall consider the conservatee’s personal values to the 
extent known to the conservator. The conservator may require the 
conservatee to receive the health care, whether or not the conservatee 
objects. 
CAL. PROB. CODE § 2355(a) (Deering 2001) (altered provisions italicized). 
84 CAL. PROB. CODE § 2355(a) (Deering 2001); CAL. PROB. CODE § 
2355(a) (West 1998) (amended 1999); see supra note 83 (quoting the older 
and amended provision). 
85 245 Cal. Rptr. 840 (Ct. App. 1988). 
86 Id. at 857-58. 
87 Id. at 856. 
88 Id. at 857. 
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b. Section 2355 After Amendment 
After its amendment, section 2355 made both formal and 
informal statements of the conservatee binding on the conservator 
to the extent that they are known.89 It codified the provision of 
the UHCDA that required the conservatee’s personal values to be 
considered in determining his best interests when his wishes are 
unknown.90 The new version of section 2355, therefore, provides 
for decisional standards that utilize to the degree possible the 
knowledge the conservator has about the wishes and values of the 
conservatee.91 
Whereas the old section 2355 recognized only written 
advance directives, the amended version gives effect to oral 
directives as well.92 Lastly, the California Law Commission 
stated that the burden of proof for the determination of the 
conservatee’s wishes or best interests under section 2355 is met 
by a preponderance of the evidence.93 
                                                          
89 CAL. PROB. CODE § 2355(a) (Deering 2001). 
90 Id.; see also UHCDA, supra note 6. 
91 CAL. PROB. CODE § 2355(a) (Deering 2001). The amended version 
adds a “substituted judgment” provision that not only shall the conservator 
“make health care decisions for the conservatee in accordance with the 
conservatee’s individual health care instructions, if any” but shall also use 
“other wishes to the extent known to the conservator.” Id. 
92 Compare CAL. PROB. CODE § 2355(a) (Deering 2001) with CAL. PROB. 
CODE § 2355(a) (West 1998) (amended 1999); see supra note 83 (quoting both 
provisions). The apparent purpose of this change is to honor the wishes of an 
individual who has not executed a written advance directive. Id. 
93 Wendland, 28 P.3d at 166.  
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II. IN RE WENDLAND94 
A. Facts and Procedural History 
Robert Wendland was an auto parts salesman from Stockton, 
California.95 He developed a drinking problem after the death of 
his father-in-law, who had been maintained on a ventilator while 
dying from gangrene.96 While watching his father-in-law in that 
condition, Robert told his wife, Rose, “I would never want to 
live like that, and I wouldn’t want my children to see me like 
that, and look at the hurt you’re going through as an adult seeing 
your father like that.”97 Robert told Rose that her father 
“wouldn’t want to live like a vegetable” and “wouldn’t want to 
live in a comatose state.”98 
Both Rose and Robert’s brother, Michael, became concerned 
about Robert’s safety because of his drinking.99 Michael told 
him, “I’m going to get a call from Rosie one day, and you’re 
going to be in a terrible accident.”100 Upon Michael’s warning 
that he would end up laying in bed “just like a vegetable,” 
Robert responded, “Mike, whatever you do[,] don’t let that 
happen. Don’t let them do that to me.”101 According to one of his 
children, Robert said during that conversation that “if he could 
not be a provider for his family, if he could not do all the things 
                                                          
94 This comment will follow the convention used by the Wendland courts, 
referring to the members of the Wendland family by their first names. See 93 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 550 (Ct. App. 2000); see also 28 P.3d 151. The purpose of this 
convention for this comment is to be consistent with the convention in the 
Wendland cases, to distinguish one family member from another, and to 
distinguish references to the court’s opinion from references to the individuals 
involved. 
95 Harriet Chiang, Right-to-Die Case Loses in State Court; Feeding Can’t 
Halted [sic] if Patient is Conscious, S. F. CHRON. Aug. 10, 2001 at A1. 
96 Wendland, 28 P.3d at 157. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
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that he enjoyed doing, just enjoying the outdoors, just basic 
things, feeding himself, talking, communicating, if he could not 
do those things, he would not want to live.”102 Rose testified that 
Robert “made clear” to her that under no circumstances would he 
want to live if he had to have diapers, if he had to have life 
support, if he had to be kept alive with a feeding tube or if he 
could not be a “husband, father, provider.”103 
Robert was severely injured in an automobile accident in 
September 1993, as a result of his driving while intoxicated.104 
He remained in a coma for sixteen months.105 Although he 
eventually regained consciousness, he was left both mentally and 
physically disabled.106 
Prior to regaining consciousness, Robert received fluid and 
nutrition through a surgically-placed feeding tube inserted into 
his small intestine.107 He first began to show signs of 
                                                          
102 Id. 
103 In re Wendland, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 550, 557-58 (Ct. App. 2000). 
104 Wendland, 28 P.3d at 154. 
105 Wendland, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 554. Coma is “a state of profound 
unconsciousness from which one cannot be roused.” STEDMAN’S MEDICAL 
DICTIONARY 385 (27th ed. 2000); see also PRINCIPLES OF NEUROLOGY, supra 
note 46, at 346-47 (defining coma and PVS). While Robert was in a coma,  
Rose visited him daily, sometimes with their children. Wendland, 28 P.3d at 
154. 
106 According to a medical report submitted to the court, Robert had the 
following medical conditions: 
[S]evere cognitive impairment that is not possible to fully appreciate 
due to the concurrent motor and communication impairments . . .  
; maladaptive behavior characterized by agitation, aggressiveness and 
non-compliance; severe paralysis on the right and moderate paralysis 
on the left; severely impaired communication without compensatory 
augmentative communication system; severe swallowing dysfunction, 
dependent upon non-oral enteric tube feeding for nutrition and 
hydration; incontinence of bowel and bladder; moderate spasticity; 
mild to moderate contractures; general dysphoria; recurrent medical 
illnesses, including pneumonia, bladder infections, sinusitus; and 
dental issues. 
Wendland, 28 P.3d at 155. 
107 Wendland, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 554-55. 
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responsiveness in late 1994 and early 1995.108 Between January 
and July of 1995, Robert’s feeding tube dislodged four times.109 
Rose authorized surgical replacement of the tube the first three 
times but refused the fourth.110 Dr. Kass, Robert’s physician, 
inserted a nasogastric feeding tube while awaiting review of the 
situation by the hospital ethics committee.111 The hospital ethics 
committee stated no objection to the removal of the feeding tube, 
and both Dr. Kass and the county patient ombudsman supported 
the decision.112 Robert’s estranged mother, Florence, and sister 
were not consulted, however, and filed for a temporary 
restraining order to block removal of the feeding tube after 
learning of the decision.113 Rose then petitioned to be appointed 
as Robert’s conservator and asked the court to confirm her 
authority to withhold nutrition and hydration.114 
The court appointed Rose as conservator but delayed deciding 
whether to authorize her to have the feeding tube removed and 
ordered her to continue the current course of therapy for sixty 
days.115 Sixty days elapsed with no change in Robert’s condition, 
and Rose again asked the court for authority to remove the 
feeding tube.116 Florence asked the court to appoint independent 
counsel for Robert, but the trial court declined and the appellate 
court denied her petition for writ of mandate.117 The California 
                                                          
108 Wendland, 28 P.3d at 154 (citing the medical report submitted to the 
court, but not specifying what signs of responsiveness were noticed). 
109 Wendland, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 555. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 Wendland, 28 P.3d at 155. See Lawrence J. Nelson & Ronald E. 
Cranford, Michael Martin and Robert Wendland: Beyond the Vegetative State, 
15 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 427, 435 (1999) (describing Robert 
Wendland’s relationship with his mother and sister). Florence learned of the 
plan via an anonymous phone call. Wendland, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 555. 
114 Wendland, 28 P.3d at 155. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. A writ of mandate is “an order from an appellate court directing a 
lower court to take a specified action.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 973 (7th 
ed. 1999). 
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Supreme Court ultimately granted review and transferred the case 
to the appellate court, which directed the trial court to appoint 
counsel for Robert; his counsel subsequently supported Rose’s 
decision.118 
Despite support for Rose’s decision by his counsel, his 
physician and the ethics committee, the trial court found that 
Robert’s statements to his wife and brother while he was 
competent were not enough to show by clear and convincing 
evidence that he would have wanted to die if he were minimally 
conscious.119 The trial court held that a conservator could 
withhold artificial nutrition and hydration from a minimally 
conscious conservatee if shown by clear and convincing evidence 
to be in the conservatee’s best interest, considering any wishes 
the conservatee may have previously expressed.120 The court 
found that Rose had not met her burden.121 Nonetheless, the court 
found that Rose had acted in good faith and allowed her to 
continue as conservator, though she would not be permitted to 
withdraw nutrition and hydration.122 
The appellate court reversed, upholding the lower court’s 
burden of proof standard but finding that the trial court erred in 
substituting its own judgment as to Robert’s best interest.123 
Applying In re Drabick,124 the court noted that the conservator 
must make the final treatment decision “regardless of how much 
or how little information about the conservatee’s preferences is 
available.”125 The appellate court then held that the trial court’s 
sole role should have been to determine whether Rose had 
                                                          
118 Wendland, 28 P.3d at 155. 
119 Id. at 157;  see supra text accompanying notes 97-103 (discussing 
Robert’s statements). 
120 See Wendland, 28 P.3d at 156. 
121 Id. at 156-57. 
122 Id. 
123 In re Wendland, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 550, 579 (Ct. App. 2000). 
 124  245 Cal. Rptr. 840 (Ct. App. 1988). 
125 Wendland, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 562 (quoting Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 
857). The court did not explain why a clear and convincing standard was 
appropriate in this case; the California Supreme Court later noted that the 
usual standard is preponderance of the evidence. Wendland, 28 P.3d at 166. 
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considered Robert’s interests in good faith but remanded to 
permit Florence to present evidence rebutting Rose’s case.126 The 
California Supreme Court granted review of the decision.127 
Robert died of pneumonia in July 2001.128 His death occurred 
after oral argument but prior to the issuance of an opinion.129 The 
California Supreme Court retained the case for decision because 
it raised “important issues” that tend to “evade review” due to 
the health of those the cases typically concern.130 
B. The Wendland Opinion 
In Wendland, the California Supreme Court reaffirmed a 
fundamental right to refuse medical treatment but was clearly 
reluctant to authorize the exercise of that right through a third 
party.131 The court held that a conservator may not withhold 
artificial nutrition and hydration from a minimally conscious 
patient in the absence of clear and convincing evidence either that 
the patient had previously expressed wishes to forgo such 
treatment or that doing so is in the patient’s best interest.132 
                                                          
126 Wendland, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 579-80. 
127 Wendland, 28 P.3d at 158. 
128 Chiang, supra note 95. It appears that Rose may have had the 
authority to refuse to authorize the provision of antibiotics to Robert, given 
her continued conservatorship, thus allowing him to die from bacterial 
pneumonia. Wendland, 28 P.3d at 157 (noting that Rose had been retained as 
conservator and that her authority to remove life sustaining medical treatment 
was restrained by the lower court in regard to withholding nutrition and 
hydration, without mention of other life sustaining treatments). No mention is 
made in any source, however, as to whether his pneumonia was viral or 
bacterial or whether he received antibiotics. Requests by the author for 
references to public sources for such information from attorneys in this case 
went unanswered. 
129 Wendland, 28 P.3d at 158. 
130 Id. at 151 n.1. 
131 Id. at 174. The court held that a conservator must prove, “by clear and 
convincing evidence, either that the conservatee wished to refuse life-
sustaining treatment or that to withhold such treatment would have been in his 
best interest.” Id. 
132 Id. at 175. 
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Throughout its decision, the court repeatedly characterized the 
issue as the intentional killing of the patient against his will.133 
This emphasis illustrates the court’s disregard for the United 
States Supreme Court’s explicit distinction between killing and 
allowing the patient to die.134 Instead of framing the issue as a 
conflict between the fundamental interest in refusing medical 
treatment versus a fundamental interest in life, with the state’s 
interest in protecting the individual’s choice as operating on both 
sides of the conflict, the court pitted the decision to withdraw 
treatment against the state’s interest in preserving life.135 
After reviewing constitutional and common law issues, 
starting with the principle that a competent person may refuse 
even life-sustaining treatment,136 the court noted that California’s 
Constitution also protects against “obvious invasions of . . . 
                                                          
133 Wendland, 28 P.3d 151, passim. For example, the court uses such 
language as: “a conservator’s proposal to end the life of a conscious 
conservatee,” id. at 156; “the conservator has claimed the authority to end the 
conservatee’s life,” id. at 158; “the statute would be understood as authorizing 
a conservator to deliberately end the life of a conservatee,” id. at 163; 
“conservators . . . contemplating a conscious conservatee’s death,” id. at 166; 
“permitting a conservator deliberately to end the life of a conscious 
conservatee,” id. at 167; “[t]he ultimate decision is whether a conservatee 
lives or dies,” id. at 169; “where a conservator proposes to end the life of a 
conscious but incompetent conservatee,” id. at 174; “[t]he result would be to 
permit a conservator freely to end a conservatee’s life,” id.; and “medical 
decisions . . . intended to bring about the death of a conscious conservatee,” 
id. at 175; see also Glenn Griener, Stopping Futile Treatment and the Slide 
Toward Non-Voluntary Euthanasia, 2 HEALTH L.J. 67 (1994) (arguing that 
courts use the same rationale for setting high evidentiary standards for 
withholding of treatment as they do for maintaining the prohibition against 
assisted suicide; i.e., to protect vulnerable persons); Adam J. Hildebrand, 
Masked Intentions: The Masquerade of Killing Thoughts Used to Justify 
Dehydrating and Starving People in a “Persistent Vegetative State” and 
People with Other Profound Neurological Impairments, 16 ISSUES L. & MED. 
143 (2000) (arguing that all decisions to withdraw nutrition and hydration are 
based on the intention to kill).  
134 See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997). None of the Wendland 
courts cited Vacco. See 28 P.3d 151; 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 550 (Ct. App 2000); 
Wendland v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 595 (Ct. App. 1996). 
135 Wendland, 28 P.3d at 160, 163. 
136 Id. at 158. 
BUCKLEYMACRO1-20.DOC 4/1/03 2:43 PM 
 IN RE WENDLAND 279 
interests fundamental to personal autonomy.”137 Following this, 
the court concluded that the decision of a competent adult to 
refuse life-sustaining treatment must be considered 
fundamental.138 Furthermore, the court noted that federal law 
does not oppose a competent adult’s refusal of medical 
treatment.139 Applying Cruzan,140 the California court inferred a 
constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted 
medical treatment, including the refusal of artificial nutrition and 
hydration.141 Consequently, the right to refuse unwanted medical 
treatment may only be infringed if the state’s interest in 
preserving life outweighs the interest of the individual.142 
Accepting that the right of a competent adult to refuse 
medical treatment would survive that adult’s incapacity, the court 
limited that survival to instances where it is “exercised while 
competent pursuant to a law giving that act lasting validity.”143 
Comparing California’s former Natural Death Act with its new 
HCDA, the court concluded that the new law “give[s] effect to 
the decision of a competent person, in the form either of 
instructions for health care or the designation of an agent or 
surrogate for health care decisions.”144 
The court, however, distinguished decisions made through an 
advance directive from those made by court-appointed 
conservators.145 Agreeing with the appellate court that the 
                                                          
137 Id. at 159 (quoting Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 865 P.2d 
633 (Cal. 1994)). 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 159-60. 
 140  Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
141 Id. at 159; see supra Part I.B (discussing Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261). 
142 Wendland, 28 P.3d at 160. 
143 Id. But see infra note 241 (arguing that the court confused the issue of 
the survival of the right with the issue of the sufficiency of the means utilized 
to prove the patient’s prior wishes). 
144 Wendland, 28 P.3d at 161. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 
7185-7188, repealed by 1999 Cal. Stat. 658 (enacting the HCDA). The 
HCDA is California’s version of the UHCDA. 1999 Cal. Stat. 658 (codified 
as CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 4600-4805 ). 
145  Wendland, 28 P.3d at 162. But see Health Care Decisions Act: 
Hearing on A.B. 891 Before the Assembly, 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999) 
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exercise of a right through another is a “legal fiction,” the court 
reviewed the alternative basis for treatment choices for 
incompetent patients offered by the Court of Appeal.146 That is, 
while most courts accept the idea that a patient’s right to choose 
or refuse medical treatment survives incompetence, what actually 
survives is the patient’s right to have appropriate medical 
decisions made for him by others in his own best interests.147 
Wendland took issue with this position, reasoning that any 
decision should reflect the conservatee’s own interests and 
values, that treatment refusal by a court-appointed conservator is 
not the equivalent of a conservatee’s refusal, and that any 
decision by a conservator does not necessarily take precedence 
over the conservatee’s right to life or the state’s interest in 
preserving life.148 
                                                          
[hereinafter Assembly Hearing on A.B. 891] (concurring in Senate 
Amendments and describing one of the purposes of the Act as “establish[ing] a 
uniform standard of decision-making for adults without decision-making 
capacity so that the same rules apply whether the decisionmaker is an agent 
under a PAHC [power of attorney for health care], another surrogate 
appointed by the patient, a conservator or a court”). Here, the court closely 
examined the Court of Appeal’s decision in Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840 (Ct. 
App. 1988) (authorizing removal of a nasogastric feeding tube from a patient 
who was not terminally ill but who was in PVS) stating that the court had 
confused the two concepts. Wendland, 28 P.3d at 161. The court examined In 
re Drabick closely because the decision had played a prominent role in both 
the Wendland parties’ arguments and the revision of California Probate Code 
section 2355, the statute governing Wendland. Id. The Court of Appeal 
viewed Drabick as a conflict between the right of the conservatee to life and 
his right to terminate unwanted treatment, and that the choice of those rights 
was to be vicariously exercised through the conservator. Id. at 162. Advance 
directives are statements, either oral or in writing, in which an individual 
expresses his wishes in advance as to what kinds of treatments he would or 
would not like to receive and the circumstances in which he wants those 
wishes honored. Thaddeus Mason Pope, The Maladaptation of Miranda to 
Advance Directives: A Critique of the Implementation of the Patient Self-
Determination Act, 9 HEALTH MATRIX 139, 149 (1999). See infra Part III.B 
(discussing advance directives). 
146 Wendland, 28 P.3d at 162-63. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. at 163. In essence, without so stating, the court rejected the “best 
interests” standard. See infra note 232 and accompanying text. The court then 
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The court next turned its attention to California Probate Code 
section 2355 and noted that the Law Review Commission 
explicitly incorporated some of Drabick’s construction of the 
former statute into the new statute.149 It compared the language of 
the former section 2355 with the new language of amended 
section 2355.150 The court construed the new language as making 
informally expressed wishes dispositive rather than merely a 
factor to be considered.151 Accepting that the revised section 2355 
could be construed as allowing a competent person to use an 
advance directive to direct all aspects of his or her future health 
care, not just the withdrawal of life support when the patient is 
terminally-ill, the court additionally determined that such wishes 
would be a constitutional basis for withdrawal or withholding of 
treatment since they would be based on the patient’s own 
wishes.152 
Nonetheless, the court contrasted decisions made based on 
statements in an advance directive with decisions made by a 
conservator, since the conservator is not appointed by the 
conservatee and cannot be presumed to have special knowledge 
of the conservatee’s wishes.153 The court briefly noted that the 
                                                          
pointed out that while no subsequent decision has rejected Drabick’s 
reasoning, neither had any court extended that reasoning to any conservatee 
who was not in PVS, and Drabick itself limited its decision to patients “for 
whom there is no reasonable hope of a return to cognitive life.” Id. (quoting 
Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, 861 n.36 (Ct. App. 1988)). But see In re Grant, 
747 P.2d 445 (Wash. 1987) cited in In re Wendland, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 550, 
566 (Ct. App. 2000), a case in which the court allowed the withdrawal of 
artificial nutrition and hydration from a patient who had never been competent 
and who was not comatose or in PVS but who was terminally ill. 
149 Wendland, 28 P.3d at 163. The court characterized Drabick’s 
conclusion as holding that “incompetent persons have a right . . . to 
appropriate medical decisions that reflect their own interests and values.” Id. 
150 Id. at 164. See supra note 83 (quoting the former and amended 
versions of section 2355). 
151 Wendland, 28 P.3d at 165. Drabick utilized the latter approach, using 
informally expressed wishes as merely a factor for consideration. 245 Cal. 
Rptr. 840, 857 (1988). 
152 Wendland, 28 P.3d at 160, 168. 
153 Id.  
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law gives preference to spouses and other relations who might 
have knowledge of the person’s wishes but focused on the fact 
that not all conservators have knowledge of those wishes.154 
Regarding the standard of proof, the court agreed that the default 
standard in civil cases is the preponderance of the evidence, the 
same standard cited by the Law Review Commission’s 
explanatory comments.155 The court, however, found such 
comments merely persuasive, as opposed to determinative, 
evidence of the intent of the legislature.156 
Whereas the United States Supreme Court held only that it 
was constitutionally permissible under the United States 
Constitution for a state to require clear and convincing evidence 
of an incompetent’s wishes,157 the California Supreme Court leapt 
forward and said that it would be unconstitutional under the 
California Constitution not to require clear and convincing 
evidence in the case of a minimally conscious patient.158 The 
                                                          
154 Id. By doing so, the court dismissed the stated intent of the legislature 
in the HCDA to set a uniform standard for decisions by all surrogates, 
regardless of the means by which they came to be the decision makers. 
Assembly Hearing on A.B. 891, supra note 145, at Summary § 5. 
155 Wendland, 28 P.3d at 166, 169. 
156 Id. The court based its dismissal of such intent on lack of evidence that 
the legislature had read every statement in its 280 page report. Id. at 166. But, 
the explanatory comments merely pointed out that the standard is always the 
preponderance of the evidence in the absence of specification otherwise; the 
court does not explain why the legislature would not have known that and 
would have assumed instead that the clear and convincing standard would 
apply. See generally id. 
157 Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
158 Wendland, 28 P.3d at 170. The court resisted Florence’s argument that 
section 2355 was unconstitutional on its face if read to permit a conservator to 
“end the life” of a conscious conservatee using only the low preponderance of 
the evidence standard. Id. at 166. Florence’s argument was based on Article I, 
Section 1 of the California Constitution. See generally id. Instead, the court 
construed the statute as requiring clear and convincing evidence to “minimize 
the possibility of its unconstitutional application” and supported the clear and 
convincing standard when necessary to protect important rights. Id. The court 
explained that its construction “does not entail a deviation from the language 
of the statute.” Id. While the language of the statute remains intact, however, 
the court has made the best interests standard impossible to apply. See infra 
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court rejected Rose’s argument that her decision did not entail 
state action and, therefore, did not implicate any constitutional 
rights.159 Noting that the state constitutional right of privacy 
protects against private conduct, the court compared decisions to 
withdraw life support with issues such as homicide, mercy 
killing, assisted suicide and euthanasia.160 Furthermore, the court 
stated that the issue involved was whether a conservatee lives or 
dies, and the risk involved is that the conservatee would be 
subjected to starvation, dehydration and death against the 
conservatee’s wishes, the consequences of which a conscious 
conservatee would perceive.161 
                                                          
Part III.C.2 (discussing this issue). The court stated that it had previously 
found that such important rights included the right to reproduce, parental 
rights, the discipline of judges, the appointment of a conservator to provide for 
a person’s personal needs and involuntary electroconvulsive therapy. 
Wendland, 28 P.3d at 169. Additionally, the court listed fundamental liberty 
interests recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court, which requires a clear and 
convincing standard for termination of parental rights, commitment to a 
mental hospital and deportation. Id. According to the court, the standard to be 
used depends on the “gravity of the consequences that would result from an 
erroneous determination of the issue involved.” Id. (quoting Weiner v. 
Fleischman, 816 P.2d 892, 898 (Cal. 1991)). 
159 Wendland, 28 P.3d at 165 n.10. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. at 169. While the court accepted the possibility that a conservatee 
might perceive unwanted efforts to keep him alive as an “unwanted intrusion,” 
it distinguished the two problems by stating that the decision to treat was 
reversible, but the decision to withdraw is not. Id. at 169-70. Technically, this 
is not true in the case of withdrawal of nutrition and hydration since death 
would not immediately follow; however, there would most likely be a narrow 
window in which to reverse the decision. In addition, while the decision to 
treat is reversible, the unwanted treatment received before treatment 
termination could not be reversed. See Nelson & Cranford, supra note 113, at 
446-49. The court supported its position with a review of cases from other 
states that are consistent with its opinion, including In re Martin, 538 N.W. 2d 
399 (Mich. 1995) (requiring the clear and convincing evidence standard for 
withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration from a minimally conscious 
patient); see supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text (discussing the case), 
and Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209; see supra Part I.B (discussing the case). 
Wendland, 28 P.3d at 170-172. The court also noted that Wisconsin has 
refused to extend its earlier decisions giving conservators of patients in PVS 
BUCKLEYMACRO1-20.DOC 4/1/03 2:43 PM 
284 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
After addressing the “primary” substituted judgment standard 
in section 2355, the court turned to the alternative “best interest” 
standard.162 This standard requires that a decision be made “in 
accordance with the conservator’s determination of the 
conservatee’s best interest . . . consider[ing] the conservatee’s 
personal values to the extent known to the conservator.”163 The 
decision must be made in good faith based on medical advice.164 
Rose argued that the trial court had applied too high a standard of 
proof, in that section 2355 gave the court the power only to 
verify that she has made a good faith decision based on medical 
advice and in consideration of the conservatee’s personal 
values.165 The court rejected that argument.166 
In its holding and throughout the decision, the court was 
careful to refer to the issue as that of decisions by conservators to 
refuse life-sustaining treatment for conservatees.167 Given the 
court’s attention to the issue of whether court-appointed 
conservators could be assumed to have special knowledge of the 
personal beliefs and values of the conservators, one could 
conceivably interpret Wendland as applying only to conservators 
and not to other surrogates’ decisions.168 This interpretation is 
                                                          
the power, as a matter of law, to withhold life-sustaining treatments. 
Wendland, 28 P.3d at 171 (discussing In Re Edna M.F., 563 N.W.2d 485 
(Wis. 1997) (finding that a woman with Alzheimer’s dementia, who had 
previously stated she would rather die from cancer than lose her mind, had not 
made a sufficiently clear statement of a desire to refuse treatment)). But, the 
Wendland court acknowledged that the Wisconsin court had only required a 
preponderance of the evidence standard. Id. But see Kathleen M. Boozang, An 
Intimate Passing: Restoring the Role of Family and Religion in Dying, 58 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 549, 577-78 (1997) (noting other courts that have rejected or 
altered the clear and convincing standard for medical decisions). 
162 Wendland, 28 P.3d at 173-74. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. at 174. 
166 Id. The court rejected Rose’s position despite her recitation of the 
language of the section and the Law Revision Commission commentary 
supporting her position. Id. 
167 Wendland, 28 P.3d 151 passim. 
168 Id. Other surrogates could be those family members making medical 
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unlikely to be accurate, however; while the court specified that 
the decision applied only to “conscious conservatees who have 
not left formal directions for health care and whose conservators 
propose to withhold life-sustaining treatment for the purpose of 
causing their conservatees’ deaths,” the court then proceeded to 
list those who would not be affected.169 The list failed to include 
patients with nonappointed surrogates.170 The list also failed to 
include the terminally ill.171 Given the above and the rarity of 
patients’ use of advance directives and oral appointment of 
surrogates, Wendland will reach a vast number of medical 
decisions and will have a profound effect on health care decisions 
in California.172 
III. THESIS 
There are four problematic issues with the court’s decision. 
First, the Wendland court underestimated the sweeping effects of 
its decision, which will affect a much greater number of patients 
                                                          
decisions for the patient without formal appointment. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 
4714 (Deering 2001) (providing standards for surrogate decision makers, 
including those “acting as a surrogate”); CAL. PROB. CODE § 4716 (Deering 
2001) (allowing domestic partners the “same authority as a spouse . . . to 
make a health care decision for his or her incapacitated spouse”). 
169 Wendland, 28 P.3d at 175. 
Our conclusion does not affect permanently unconscious patients, 
including those who are comatose or [in PVS] . . . , persons who 
have left legally cognizable instructions for health care . . . , persons 
who have designated agents or other surrogates for health care . . . , 
or conservatees for whom conservators have made medical decisions 
other than those intended to bring about the death of a conscious 
conservatee. 
 Id. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. 
172 See discussion infra Part III (arguing that the combination of a greater 
number of affected patients than the Wendland court apparently realized, the 
rarity of advance provisions by patients for health care decisions and the 
contrast between the Wendland standard and the understanding of most 
patients will lead to a major change in the way health care decisions are made 
in California). 
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than the court acknowledged.173 Second, the court’s reliance on 
patient-provided directives to afford incompetent patients the care 
they would have chosen for themselves was misplaced.174 Third, 
the court’s understanding of the means by which patient 
autonomy is promoted is extraordinarily limited.175 Fourth, as a 
result of the court’s incorrect balancing of the interests involved, 
the court erroneously concluded that protecting patients’ interests 
requires application of the clear and convincing evidence 
standard.176 
The result of Wendland is that family members in California 
are proscribed from making many decisions for their loved ones 
when those loved ones did not have the requisite foresight or 
knowledge to appoint them as surrogates.177 Wendland essentially 
                                                          
173 See infra Part III.A (arguing that the court misperceived the frequency 
of the need for decisions for life-sustaining treatment for patients in a 
minimally conscious state). 
174 See infra Part III.B (noting the rarity of the execution of advance 
directives and appointment of surrogates). 
175 See infra Part III.C. Studies have shown that most people in this 
country prefer to have their families make medical decisions for them when 
they are incapacitated. The Wendland court, however, intervened and removed 
the decision making ability from the family out of the contradictory fear that 
the decision is not what the patient would have wanted. See generally 
Wendland, 28 P.3d 151. In doing so, the court failed to recognize its own 
conflict of interest. That is, the standard the court applies in the instant case 
must be designed to protect future patients, even if that results in a decision in 
the instant case that may not have been what the patient wanted. 
176 See infra Part III.D (arguing that the clear and convincing standard is 
not constitutionally required). See also Marybeth Herald, Until Life Support 
Do Us Part: A Spouse’s Limited Ability to Terminate Life Support for an 
Incompetent Spouse with No Hope of Recovery, 24 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 
207, 212 (2002) (arguing that Wendland “places a nearly insurmountable 
burden of proof on the conservator of a person in a minimally conscious state” 
and that “[t]he [c]ourt’s decision makes it virtually impossible to stop feeding 
and hydration when the family member has not made any written advance 
directive”). 
177 Wendland, 28 P.3d 151. In addition to the insufficiency of the means 
on which the court relied to mitigate the adverse effects of the court’s 
decision, there are other unintended effects that the court appears not to have 
anticipated. For example, a person appointed as conservator by the patient but 
who has only a professional relationship with the patient and/or who is a 
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coerces patients to exercise their autonomy, a contradictory 
concept.178 
To protect the rights of patients, the California legislature 
must now amend the HCDA. The amendments should clearly 
state that those closest to the patient are the appropriate decision 
makers, absent evidence to the contrary. In addition, the 
amendments must specify the procedural safeguards to be used, 
and must clearly identify “preponderance of the evidence” as the 
desired standard for decisions made in the face of such 
                                                          
relative stranger to him, would be free under the court’s interpretation to 
withdraw or withhold treatment with little to no beneficial knowledge of the 
patient’s wishes or values. See id. Yet, ironically, family members with an 
intimate understanding of the patient would still be subject to the clear and 
convincing standard. See id. Lastly, the opinion’s reliance on the distinction 
between unconscious patients and those who are minimally conscious leaves 
the door open to terminate treatment while the patient is comatose. See id. at 
175. A surrogate’s hesitation—most likely in hopes that the patient will 
awaken to a life of greater functioning—thus leads to the inability to honor a 
patient’s wishes once the surrogate becomes convinced it is time to do so. The 
unspoken, and likely unintended, message the court has thus sent to surrogates 
is that they should discontinue support for their unconscious family members 
as soon as a claim for “permanent” unconsciousness can be made, rather than 
risk them waking into what they believe the patient would consider to be an 
unacceptable state. In hindsight, Robert’s coma was not permanent; however, 
it is doubtful that a claim of permanent unconsciousness that was made after 
more than a full year would have been challenged. See id. at 154. The court’s 
opinion glossed over the fact that Rose had authorized treatment for Robert 
during the period in which he was not conscious. Id. In the California 
Supreme Court’s recitation of the facts, it referred to Robert’s coma as lasting 
only “several months.” Id. According to the appellate court, however, Robert 
was in a coma for sixteen months. In re Wendland, 93 Cal. Rptr. 550, 554 
(Ct. App. 2000). 
178 Autonomy is the voluntary exercise of a personal choice. BEAUCHAMP 
& CHILDRESS, supra note 9, at 58. The choice of most adults is to have their 
family make whatever medical decisions they deem necessary on their behalf 
in the event of incapacity. See infra Part III.C.2. In addition, most adults resist 
executing advance directives. See infra Part III.C.2. Wendland severely 
restricts the choices available to decision makers that have not been appointed 
by the patient. See generally Wendland, 28 P.3d 151. In order to avoid such 
restriction under Wendland, potential patients will be forced to appoint a 
surrogate or execute an advance directive; as a result, the voluntary aspect of 
the choice is missing, and the choice is, therefore, coerced. 
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safeguards. 
A. Applicability of Wendland 
Despite the court’s assurances that its decision affects only a 
“narrow class of persons” and not “the vast majority of health 
care decisions,” Wendland will affect more individuals than the 
court anticipated.179 Wendland will have a profound impact on 
decisions for the terminally-ill, those suffering from dementia but 
who are not considered terminally-ill, all adults who have never 
been competent and all minors. Given the low rate of execution 
of advance directives and the inability of many to utilize the 
options of oral directives and appointment of surrogates, it is 
reasonable to assume that surrogates other than those appointed 
by the patient will make the majority of the decisions in these 
cases and will be subject to Wendland’s constraints.180 
Of the approximately six thousand deaths that occur daily in 
the United States, it is estimated that approximately seventy 
percent involve decisions to forgo life-sustaining treatment.181 
Many, if not the majority, of such cases involve terminally ill 
patients for whom, therefore, a different legal standard might 
logically apply.182 Still, there would remain a significant number 
                                                          
179 Wendland, 28 P.3d at 166. “[W]e see no constitutional reason to apply 
the higher evidentiary standard to the majority of health care decisions made 
by conservators not contemplating a conscious conservatee’s death.” Id. 
180 See infra Part III.B (discussing the limited utilization of advance 
directives and oral appointment of surrogates). 
181 See Rebecca Dresser, Missing Persons: Legal Perceptions of 
Incompetent Patients, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 609, 614 (1994) (citing estimates 
from the American Hospital Association, the President’s Commission for the 
Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral 
Research, and other authors). The percentage may be as high as seventy-five 
percent. Steven Miles, Personal Dying and Medical Death, in BIRTH TO 
DEATH: SCIENCE AND BIOETHICS 163, 167 (David C. Thomasma & 
Thomasine Kushner eds., 1996) 
182 Cantor, supra note 11, at 184. The purpose of a higher standard is to 
avoid the risk of erroneous decisions. Wendland, 28 P.3d at 170. Terminally 
ill patients will die in a short time whether treatment is withheld or not; 
therefore, the risk of an erroneous decision is less and courts presumably 
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of cases that would not involve terminally ill patients.183 For 
example, patients with dementia often retain some level of 
cognitive functioning before they are deemed terminally ill, yet 
after questions of life-sustaining treatments arise.184 In addition, 
given the rarity of PVS, it is reasonable to assume that the 
majority of such decisions involve patients who are at least 
minimally conscious.185 As a result, the “narrow class” that 
Wendland affects in fact includes a significant number of 
                                                          
would be willing to utilize a lower standard. It is not clear, however, that the 
court intended a different standard for those cases, since the court exempted 
“permanently unconscious patients, including those who are comatose or in a 
persistent vegetative state,” but did not exempt the terminally ill. Id. at 175. 
183 See infra notes 184-85. 
184 Dresser, supra note 181, at 614. Dementia may occur as a result of 
chronic conditions such as chronic liver or renal disease, Parkinsons disease or 
metabolic problems. NEUROLOGY FOR THE NON-NEUROLOGIST 233-41 
(William J. Weiner & Christopher G. Goetz eds., 4th ed. 1999). Dementia as 
a result of AIDS, cerebrovascular injury and Alzheimer’s disease affects an 
increasing number of people, and the incidence is likely to increase with the 
aging of the population and the increasing ability of medical technology to 
prolong biologic life. See Dresser, supra note 181, at 614. The mean 
incidence of moderate to severe dementia in persons over the age of sixty in 
the U.S. has been calculated at 4.8 %. PRINCIPLES OF NEUROLOGY, supra note 
46, at 1049. Alzheimer’s alone was the eighth leading cause of death in both 
1998 and 1999, with 35,306 and 44,536 deaths per year, respectively. NAT’L 
CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND 
PREVENTION, 49 NAT’L VITAL STATISTICS REPORT NO. 11 (2001) [hereinafter 
NAT’L VITAL STATISTICS REPORT], available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/ 
data/nvsr/nvsr49/nvsr49_11.pdf. Alzheimer’s disease is progressively 
debilitating, leading to the gradual loss of cognitive ability and diminishing 
ability to care for one’s own needs, including feeding. PRINCIPLES OF 
NEUROLOGY, supra note 46, at 1050-51; see also NEUROLOGY FOR THE NON-
NEUROLOGIST, supra, at 234-35. Decisions relating to the care of those in the 
later stages of Alzheimer’s alone warrant concern over the applicability of the 
court’s decision. 
185 See Cranford, supra note 2, at 196. It is estimated that there are 
approximately 15,000 to 35,000 patients in PVS in the United States. Id. Such 
patients may linger for many years. Id. It is estimated that there are 
approximately 2,190,000 deaths per year in the United States. Dresser, supra 
note 181, at 614. Therefore, even if all PVS patients were suddenly to die in 
the same year, it would still only represent .7 to .16 % of the deaths for that 
year. 
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individuals. 
While the court’s holding specifically referred to conservators 
and did not mention other surrogates, the reasoning of the court 
indicates that its holding applies to all surrogates making 
treatment refusals.186 In addition, minors, who are not legally 
competent, and never-competent adults would always be subject 
to the heightened standard of “best interests,” which the court 
declined to define.187 As a result, such cases will be decided on 
an individual basis, despite the legislature’s finding that courts 
are the decision-makers of last resort.188 
B. The Court’s Attempt to Mitigate the Decision’s Effect 
Wendland’s reliance on patient-provided directives and 
appointment of surrogates is unjustified.189 The Wendland court 
                                                          
186 Wendland, 28 P.3d at 175. The court rejected the argument that 
genuine treatment desires would be frustrated, basing the rejection on the 
availability of advance directives and oral appointment of surrogates; the court 
appears to assume that all decisions will either be made by conservators or 
surrogates appointed by the patient. Id. at 172. But see infra Part III.B 
(explaining that few adults have appointed surrogates or made advance 
directives). 
187 Wendland, 28 P.3d at 174. “We need not in this case attempt to define 
the extreme factual predicates that, if proved by clear and convincing 
evidence, might support a conservator’s decision that withdrawing life support 
would be in the best interests of a conscious conservatee.” Id. 
188 CAL. PROB. CODE § 4650 (Deering 2001). 
 (b) Modern medical technology has made possible the artificial 
prolongation of human life beyond natural limits. In the interest of 
protecting individual autonomy, this prolongation of the process of 
dying for a person for whom continued health care does not improve 
the prognosis for recovery may violate patient dignity and cause 
unnecessary pain and suffering, while providing nothing medically 
necessary or beneficial to the person. 
(c) In the absence of controversy, a court is normally not the proper 
forum in which to make health care decisions, including decisions 
regarding life-sustaining treatment. 
 Id. at § 4650(b)-(c). 
189 See Wendland, 28 P.3d at 172. In order for such reliance to be 
justified, there would have to be evidence that the vast majority of such 
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focused heavily on written advance directives as a means for 
competent individuals to plan for their care in the event they 
become incapacitated.190 Advance directives, also known as 
Living Wills, were proposed for just such purposes.191 
Nevertheless, only ten to twenty-five percent of adults in the 
United States have executed advance directives.192 Despite 
legislative and academic support, aggressive programs to increase 
their use have failed.193 
                                                          
decision are made for adults who were once competent, that competent adults 
are aware that they are available, are aware of the importance of executing 
them, are not resistant to executing them and do not assume that their families 
will be able to make whatever choices seem appropriate to them. See infra 
notes 192-95, 229-31 and accompanying text (arguing that such conditions do 
not exist). 
190 Wendland, 28 P.3d at 160-61. The court discussed advance directives 
extensively and dismissed the contention that a high evidentiary burden of 
proof would “frustrate many genuine treatment desires,” based on the 
availability of advance directives, including oral health care instructions. Id. at 
172. But see Dresser, supra note 181, at 632 (noting the inevitable general 
nature of the instructions in advance directives and the failure of even 
aggressive programs to increase the use of advance directives). See also 
Patricia D. White, Appointing a Proxy Under the Best of Circumstances, 1992 
UTAH L. REV. 849 (1992). White argues that 
a living will is a very crude instrument to use for making actual 
medical decisions . . . . [A]ll it can express is what a competent 
person thought she would want were she to become incompetent and 
be in a situation generically like the one she turns out actually to be in 
. . . . [I]t is a mistake to conceive of an advance directive as 
expressing an incompetent patient’s autonomous choice in any 
specific circumstance. 
 Id. at 857. 
191 See Orentlicher, supra note 9, at 1256. 
192 Pope, supra note 145, at 154. Some studies show that the percentage 
may be as low as five. See Orentlicher, supra note 9, at 1270. Even health 
care professionals tend not to complete advance directives. Id. at 1273. In 
addition, African-American patients are more likely to fear that executing an 
advance directive will adversely affect their care. Orentlicher, supra note 9, at 
1276. 
193 See, e.g., The SUPPORT Principal Investigators, A Controlled Trial 
to Improve Care in Seriously Ill Hospitalized Patients: The Study to 
Understand Prognoses and Preferences for Outcomes and Risks of Treatments, 
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Even when executed, advance directives often fail to provide 
clear guidance; they are often vague and do not address the 
specific circumstances of the patient.194 In any case, such 
directives reflect only what the competent person thinks he may 
want in a situation he is not then experiencing.195 In addition, 
strict adherence to statements in advance directives may frustrate 
the state’s interest in preserving life in cases where the family 
                                                          
274 JAMA 1591 (1995) (describing a study in which the interventions were 
designed to improve communication between patients and physicians on end-
of-life decision making but which failed to improve the incidence or timing of 
discussions relating to patient wishes for cardiopulmonary resuscitation); see 
also Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 
4206, 104 Stat. 1388, § 4206 (1990) (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1991)) 
(including as a budget amendment the PSDA, encouraging the execution of 
advance directives by requiring healthcare providers to provide information to 
patients regarding advance directives); see generally Edward J. Larson & 
Thomas A. Eaton, The Limits of Advance Directives: A History and 
Assessment of the Patient Self-Determination Act, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
249 (1997) (discussing the PSDA).  
194 Dresser, supra note 181, at 632 (stating that “[i]n most real cases, our 
knowledge of the incompetent patient’s past is limited to fuzzy comments and 
ambiguous behavior”); accord, Linda C. Fentiman, Privacy and Personhood 
Revisited: A New Framework for Substitute Decisionmaking for the 
Incompetent, Incurably Ill Adult, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 801, 824 (1989) 
(blaming in part “the pervasive use in the living will statutes of vague and 
sometimes circular definitions of such crucial terms as ‘terminally ill,’ 
‘imminent death,’ [and] ‘artificial’ life sustaining treatment”); see also Cantor, 
supra note 11, at 190 (describing “the imprecision or vagueness frequently 
present in advance directives”). 
195 See White, supra note 190, at 857 (describing any choice made in a 
living will as “a choice which the patient has necessarily made on the basis of 
incomplete information”); see also Susan Adler Channick, The Myth of 
Autonomy at the End-of-Life: Questioning the Paradigm of Rights, 44 VILL. L. 
REV. 577, 610 (1999) (arguing that “the potential for mistake or abuse is 
compounded by the possibility that the advance directive no longer represents 
the patient’s wishes”). Evidence suggests that even competent adults cannot 
accurately predict what their wishes will be in a given situation until they 
actually experience it. See Dresser, supra note 181, at 632 (noting that “even 
the most carefully considered advance choices are not as informed as we 
would like them to be, since typically the patient has never actually faced the 
situation that eventually emerges”). 
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believes the patient would have changed his mind.196 Courts 
should rely on written advance directives only if competent adults 
actually execute such documents, if the directives are 
unambiguous and if individuals can both accurately predict what 
type of care they would or would not want in the future and be 
unlikely to change their minds.197 
                                                          
196 In re Westchester County Med. Ctr. ex rel. O’Connor, 531 N.E.2d 
607, 613 (N.Y. 1988) (noting that “human beings are incapable of perfect 
foresight”); accord Dresser, supra note 181, at 632 (discussing a “risk that 
uninformed people will inadvertently issue directives that substantially threaten 
their interests as incompetent persons”); White, supra note 190, at 857 
(arguing that the problems inherent in advance directives make “it [ ] a 
mistake to conceive of an advance directive as expressing an incompetent 
patient’s autonomous choice in any specific circumstance”). Absolute reliance 
on advance directives requires family members to withhold treatment based on 
a loved one’s advance directives, despite their current belief that the condition 
the patient is in is not as distasteful as the patient had anticipated. Dresser, 
supra note 181, at 631 (arguing that “[e]ven when people exercise due 
diligence and provide an explicit indication of their wishes, those who remain 
still may be uncertain of what the patient ‘would want’ in treatment situations 
that later materialize”). Written advance directives also allow patients to 
appoint someone to make decisions for them; however, there is no guarantee 
that the choices made by that appointee would be any more consistent with 
what the patient would have wanted. THE NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON 
LIFE AND THE LAW, NEW YORK STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, WHEN OTHERS 
MUST CHOOSE: DECIDING FOR PATIENTS WITHOUT CAPACITY 7 (1992) 
[hereinafter TASK FORCE]. In fact, studies have shown that choices made by 
surrogates often differ from those the patient would have made; however, in 
most cases, the surrogates would have accepted the treatment while the patient 
would have refused it. Orentlicher, supra note 9, at 1279; see also Cantor, 
supra note 11, at 189 (arguing that advance directives are most useful for 
evidence of “well developed and enduring notions of dignity, religion, and 
consideration for loved ones, which they want reflected in their future medical 
handling”); TASK FORCE, supra, at 7. 
197 But see Cantor, supra note 11, at 189 (noting that some commentators 
“doubt the utility of advance directives” due to the need for a “declarant [to] 
anticipate a multitude of possible medical scenarios” and “project how he or 
she will feel in a variety of inherently unknowable incompetent mental 
states”); Dresser, supra note 181 (arguing that competent persons’ statements 
on death and dying are only “a piece of the puzzle, for their situations and 
experiences are now vastly altered” and proposing a revised “best interests” 
standard looking at their current experience more than what their predictions 
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In addition to the limited utility of advance directives, the 
high evidentiary burden set in Wendland frustrates the ability to 
honor genuine treatment desires, particularly in the case of the 
young and the poor.198 The court dismissed these concerns, 
pointing out that the law allows for oral instructions and oral 
appointment of surrogates.199 While oral appointment of 
surrogates and oral instructions may mitigate the problem in 
some cases, it is not clear that it will do so in a significant 
percentage of cases. Since oral instructions and designations are 
valid in California only during the course of treatment, illness or 
health care institution stay in which the designation was made, 
the court apparently assumed that the patient will be competent 
when treatment is initiated and that either the patient or the 
physician will initiate a conversation for the purpose of eliciting 
such statements.200 To the contrary, studies show that neither 
physicians nor patients do, in fact, initiate discussions about 
patients’ wishes for future treatment, even when they are 
seriously ill.201 Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that a 
significant number of patients arrive at health care facilities 
incompetent due to the severity of their illness or injury. Since 
young people are more likely to be injured than to be taken ill, 
                                                          
for what their experience would be, in order to protect patients from 
burdensome decisions either to treat or withhold treatment). 
198 In re Wendland, 28 P.3d 151, 172 (Cal. 2001) (citing an unnamed 
Brief of Amici Curiae) (citation omitted). 
199 Id. at 172. 
200 See generally Wendland, 28 P.3d 151. California law was further 
amended in 2001 to limit the applicability of oral designation of surrogates to 
“the course of treatment or illness or during the stay in the health care 
institution when the surrogate designation is made, or for 60 days, whichever 
period is shorter.” CAL. PROB. CODE § 4711(b) (Deering 2002) (emphasis 
added to new provisions). As a result, the designation of a surrogate at the 
beginning of what becomes a lengthy hospital stay may expire prior to the 
patient, leaving the patient without a surrogate who can legally effectuate his 
wishes for termination of treatment by the time the patient would most have 
wanted his wishes to be followed. 
201 Orentlicher, supra note 9, at 1268-69 (citing studies showing that 
physicians believe that they know what the patients want, but in fact matched 
their patients wishes no better than chance would provide). 
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they may be disproportionately affected by an inability to make 
an oral instruction.202 Additionally, as a result of lack of health 
insurance, the poor may be more likely to delay seeking health 
care until they are past the point of being able to make decisions 
for themselves.203 There is also evidence that nonwhite patients 
are less likely to discuss treatment preferences with their 
physicians.204 
Given that written advance directives and oral appointment of 
surrogates are not available to all patients, are not widely used 
and are often ambiguous, these means of expressing choices are 
unlikely to pass the Wendland court’s high standard of proof and 
reliance on them as a means to protect patients from burdensome 
treatments is misplaced.205 The result of the court’s interpretation 
of advance directives is that patients will be forced to appoint 
proxies or execute advance directives to avoid decisions they 
would not necessarily approve later.206 
                                                          
202 See Fentiman, supra note 194, at 803 (noting that the young are less 
likely to suffer from chronic disease and disability). Accidents were the fifth 
leading cause of death in the U.S. in both 1998 and 1999, with 97,835 and 
97,860 deaths per year, respectively. NAT’L VITAL STATISTICS REPORT, supra 
note 184. 
203 SUSAN SHERWIN, NO LONGER PATIENT: FEMINIST ETHICS AND 
HEALTH CARE 222 (1992). 
204 Orentlicher, supra note 9, at 1276 (noting that the studies showed that 
the disparity persists even after correcting for income and education). 
205 By definition, advance directives are executed by competent adults; 
minors and developmentally disabled adults thus cannot make advance 
directives. Cantor, supra note 11, at 189-90; see also Ardath A. Hamann, 
Family Surrogate Laws: A Necessary Supplement to Living Wills and Durable 
Powers of Attorney, 38 VILL. L. REV. 103, 124 (1993). 
206 See generally In re Wendland, 28 P.3d 151 (Cal. 2001). In addition, 
the reliance on advance directives, even oral directives, to correct the potential 
for providing unwanted care is not only unwarranted, it could also leave 
Wendland’s interpretation of section 2355 open to attack on Equal Protection 
grounds. In an Equal Protection Analysis, the court must utilize strict scrutiny 
when assessing the validity of state intervention in decisions affecting suspect 
classifications such as race or affecting fundamental rights. GERALD GUNTHER 
& KATHLEEN SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 630 (13th ed. 1991). Here, it 
could be argued that the de facto requirement of Wendland that a competent 
adult must complete an advance directive in order to avoid unwanted life-
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C. The Court’s Attempt to Honor Autonomy 
The Wendland court based its reasoning on the need to honor 
Robert’s autonomy.207 Throughout its opinion, however, the court 
neglected to acknowledge that the exercise of autonomy involves 
the choice between two fundamental rights directly opposed to 
each other: the fundamental right to life and the fundamental 
right to refuse life-sustaining treatment.208 Instead, the court 
focused on the state’s interest in preserving life as measured 
against each of those choices.209 As a result, the court clearly 
gave greater weight to the state’s interest, despite the apparent 
equality of the individual’s conflicting rights. The court failed to 
reconcile these rights.210 
1. Basis for the Court’s Concern 
The Wendland court’s emphasis on the need for stringent 
protection of Robert’s right to life appears to have been based on 
assumptions about the nature of the minimally conscious state and 
the motives of those choosing to withdraw treatment in that 
                                                          
sustaining medical care when incompetent not only has a disparate impact on 
minorities, since they are more resistant to completing such directives, but 
additionally affects the fundamental right to privacy on which the Wendland 
court based the right to refuse medical care. Wendland, 28 P.3d at 165 n.10. 
207 See Wendland, 28 P.3d at 159, 168. 
208 Id., passim. To avoid unconstitutional application of section 2355, the 
court construed the statute to require proof by clear and convincing evidence. 
Id. at 166. But, the court had earlier accepted the notion that an individual also 
has the fundamental right to refuse treatment and that such right would survive 
incapacity “if exercised while competent pursuant to a law giving that act 
lasting validity.” Id. at 160. The court specifically refused to equate the right 
to refuse treatment with the “right to an appropriate decision by a court-
appointed conservator.” Id. at 163. 
209 Id. But see Hamann, supra note 205, at 141-46 (arguing that the 
state’s interest in preserving life does not extend to personal decisions by an 
individual regarding his own life). 
210 See generally Wendland, 28 P.3d 151. The court did note that neither 
may be infringed unless clearly outweighed by the state’s interest. Id. at 160, 
163. 
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circumstance.211 The court appeared convinced that there is a 
distinct, relevant difference between PVS and a minimally 
conscious state and stated concern that “a person whose 
permanent unconsciousness prevents him from perceiving that 
artificial hydration and nutrition are being withdrawn arguably 
has a more attenuated interest in avoiding that result than a 
person who may consciously perceive the effects of dehydration 
and starvation.”212 The potential that a minimally conscious 
patient will perceive physical or psychological discomfort during 
treatment, however, has led some to claim that a minimally 
conscious patient has an even greater interest in having treatment 
withheld.213 Moreover, some have argued that there is more 
similarity than dissimilarity between PVS and a minimally 
conscious state.214 
The court also assumed that Robert’s statement that he 
wouldn’t want to live “like a vegetable” meant that he was 
referring specifically to PVS.215 Not only is there no evidence 
that Robert understood the distinction or intended to limit his 
request to PVS, but he specifically made statements that would 
indicate otherwise.216 The court also distinguished Robert’s 
                                                          
211 See Hamann, supra note 205, at 138-59 (listing numerous assumptions 
courts tend to make when deciding cases involving personal medical 
decisions). 
212 Wendland, 28 P.3d at 163. 
213 See, e.g., Nelson & Cranford, supra note 113, at 447-48. 
Additionally, it has been argued that any physical discomfort could be 
alleviated. Id. Accord, Michelle M. Mello, Note, Death Life, and Uncertainty: 
Allocating the Risk of Error in the Decision to Terminate Life, 109 YALE L.J. 
635 (1999). 
214 See, e.g., Nelson & Cranford, supra note 113, at 449 (arguing that the 
two states are more alike than dissimilar, where both states offer little more 
than biological existence, neither offers a reasonable chance of recovery, most 
patients would desire release from that state, and both lead to the wish “not to 
kill the patient but to let nature take its course by removing unwanted and 
nonbeneficial treatment”).  
215 Wendland, 28 P.3d at 157, 173. 
216 Id. at 157. His daughter recalled Robert saying that “if he could not do 
all the things that he enjoyed doing, just enjoying the outdoors, just basic 
things, feeding himself, talking, communicating, if he could not do those 
things, he would not want to live.” Id. Robert’s description is consistent with 
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situation from that of the terminally-ill patient,217 yet at the same 
time the court recognized the precarious health of those whom 
the cases typically concern.218 In addition, the court appears to 
have assumed that the motives of family members who request 
treatment termination for their incompetent relatives are suspect 
and the motives of family members who choose to treat are 
not.219 The court, however, provided no support for any of its 
                                                          
a minimally conscious state and not as limited as PVS. See supra note 46 for a 
description of patients in PVS. 
217 Id. at 153. 
218 Id. at 154 n.1. “[A]s this case demonstrates, these issues tend to evade 
review because they typically concern persons whose health is seriously 
impaired.” Id. 
219 See generally Wendland, 28 P.3d 151. Some commentators share the 
court’s concern. See, e.g., Aaron N. Krupp, Health Care Surrogate Statutes: 
Ethics Pitfalls Threaten the Interests of Incompetent Patients, 101 W. VA. L. 
REV. 99 (1998). However, based on personal experience as a consultant on a 
tertiary care hospital’s Ethics Consultation Service, the author believes this 
assumption to be the opposite of the norm. While there are undoubtedly some 
instances where family members are operating out of suspect motives in asking 
to withdraw treatment, the more common scenario in the author’s experience 
is that it is the estranged family member and the one with the strained 
relationship with the patient who is most likely to resist termination of 
treatment. While the author is not aware of any studies specifically looking at 
this issue, there are cases in the literature where the decision maker may have 
insisted on continuing treatment as a result of a strained relationship. See, 
e.g., “Code Him ‘Til He’s Brain Dead!,” in INTRODUCTION TO CLINICAL 
ETHICS 169-70 (John C. Fletcher et al. eds., 1995) (hereinafter CLINICAL 
ETHICS) (describing a case in which the estranged daughters of an abusive 
alcoholic insisted on providing aggressive treatment for their father despite his 
physicians’ recommendations to the contrary). One commentator argues that 
there has not been one case in which it has been shown that the family was 
“motivated by financial considerations,” despite courts’ frequent mention of 
this potential problem. Hamann, supra note 205, at 152. In addition, family 
members could simply “walk away” if they wish to avoid financial or 
emotional burdens of caring for the patient. Id. at 153. In contrast to the 
courts’ concern, studies have shown that family members are less likely to 
discontinue treatment for another than they would be for themselves. Id. at 
152. In the Wendland case, it was Robert’s estranged mother and sister who 
opposed treatment termination; neither had visited Robert’s home for ten 
years, neither acknowledged or celebrated birthdays or holidays with him, and 
Robert had refused to attend his sister’s wedding. Nelson & Cranford, supra 
BUCKLEYMACRO1-20.DOC 4/1/03 2:43 PM 
 IN RE WENDLAND 299 
assumptions.220 
2. The Court’s Application of the Concept of Autonomy 
The Wendland court concluded that the guiding principle 
underlying the changes to section 2355 was a respect for personal 
autonomy.221 The court’s decision, however, has the anomalous 
effect of limiting that autonomy. The court struggled with 
somewhat competing goals: to respect and protect Robert’s 
autonomy by ensuring that any decisions made for him are made 
based on his own wishes, not for the benefit of others,222 and to 
protect future, similarly situated individuals.223 These goals are 
fundamentally at odds inasmuch as it is difficult, at best, to honor 
the idiosyncratic choices of one individual while simultaneously 
striving to achieve consistent results in future cases of other 
idiosyncratic individuals.224 Similarly, it is contradictory to claim 
that an individual requires protection from choices made for the 
benefit of others and simultaneously apply a next-to-impossible 
standard to the instant case in order to protect future 
individuals.225 Such a standard may be a reflection of the court’s 
                                                          
note 113, at 435. While the psychological implications of decisions to 
withdraw treatment are beyond the scope of this article, there appears to be at 
least enough of a question on the issue to reject the presumption that treatment 
termination decisions are more suspect than treatment continuation decisions. 
220 See generally Wendland, 28 P.3d 151. 
221 Id. at 168 (noting that the “only apparent purpose of requiring 
conservators to make decisions in accordance with the conservatee’s wishes, 
when those wishes are known, is to enforce the fundamental principle of 
personal autonomy”). 
222 Id. at 172. Granted, this is a legal fiction since Robert had already 
died at the time of the decision; however, the same argument could be made 
for each case decided under the court’s standard. See id. at 158. 
223 JANE C. GINSBURG, LEGAL METHODS at 1 (1996). 
224 See White, supra note 190, at 860 (arguing that “a presumption in 
favor of a specified family decision maker would at least allow for the 
possibility that different decisions would be made for different patients, and 
thus acknowledge the fact that people’s preferences, as expressed when they 
are competent, differ.”) 
225 See generally Wendland, 28 P.3d 151. 
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own worldview and desire for a particular outcome rather than 
those of the patient.226 
Autonomy, according to the court, is exercised only through 
specific statements of a competent adult.227 This is unnecessarily 
strict. Autonomy may be equally exercised by delegating one’s 
choices to another.228 For example, studies indicate that most 
patients trust their family members to make decisions for them.229 
Additionally, many patients prefer to have surrogates determine 
the patient’s best interests rather than decide on the basis of the 
surrogate’s view of the patient’s preferences.230 After Wendland, 
                                                          
226 Id. at 170 (referring to providing care against the patient’s wishes as 
the “less perilous result” when compared to withdrawing treatment). See 
Boozang, supra note 161 (arguing that courts have taken either a “vitalist” 
stance, favoring life above all other considerations, or a “qualitist” stance, 
considering quality of life issues in the determination of best interests); see 
also Matthew S. Ferguson, Note, Ethical Postures of Futility and California’s 
Uniform Health Care Decisions Act, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1217, 1244 (2002) 
(arguing that the Wendland court was interested “in the results, rather than the 
process of patient decisionmaking” and “focused on the ends, not means”). 
The court is not alone in viewing the case with an eye toward future patients; 
eight amicus briefs were filed on behalf of Rose and Robert and thirteen 
amicus briefs were filed on behalf of Florence. See Wendland, 28 P.3d 151. 
But see Hamann, supra note 205, at 165-66 (arguing that “strangers with 
political agenda[s]” should not be allowed to intervene in cases involving 
personal medical decisions since such groups “do not see the patient as a 
person but as a symbol of a cause”). 
227 Wendland, 28 P.3d at 172 (noting that requiring clear statements is for 
the purpose of effectuating the patient’s right to refuse). 
228 See Orentlicher, supra note 9, at 1280 (arguing that “[t]he important 
point is that the patient has decided how the decision will be made”). Such 
delegation need not be formal, as with legal appointment by adults of 
surrogates. Id. 
229 TASK FORCE, supra note 196, at 6-7. One survey showed that eighty-
five percent of those polled believed that the family and the patient’s 
physicians should make end-of-life treatment decisions for incapacitated 
patients. Id. at 6 n.2 (citing a Time Magazine/CNN poll conducted in October 
of 1989). 
230 Orentlicher, supra note 9, at 1280 nn.156-57 (noting various studies 
showing that greater than ninety percent of those surveyed preferred to have 
family members serve as surrogates, and that greater than fifty percent favored 
the best interests standard over the substituted judgment standard). Studies 
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however, failure to name a health care proxy must be interpreted 
as an indication that decisions by family members would be 
unwelcome.231 This interpretation fails to honor the autonomous 
wishes of the majority to have their families choose for them. 
The anomalous result of Wendland is that the very changes to 
section 2355 that embodied the principle of respect for autonomy 
have been eliminated. In effect, the court rejected the best 
interest standard of section 2355 by requiring a standard of proof 
that cannot be met in any case in which section 2355 would 
apply.232 By requiring clear and convincing evidence and ignoring 
the amended statute’s attempt to increase the use of the 
conservatee’s wishes and values in decisions when his wishes in 
the instant situation are unclear, the court clearly favored the 
right to life over the right to refuse treatment.233 In effect, this 
                                                          
have also shown that most patients would want family members to have at 
least “a little leeway” to override their directives if necessary to protect their 
future interests. Dresser, supra note 181, at 631 (citing a study of dialysis 
patients, in which “sixty-one percent wanted surrogates to have ‘a little 
leeway’ to override the directives if necessary to protect their future best 
interests, while thirty-one percent wanted surrogates to have ‘complete 
leeway’”). Such future interests could include the interest in preserving life 
when the individual actually enjoys a quality of life greater than what he had 
anticipated. Id. at 624 (citing the hypothetical example of a musician who 
executed an advance directive requiring discontinuance of treatment in the 
event of incapacity and inability to experience music but who later appears to 
be enjoying her life in the face of senile dementia and a curable illness; citing 
also the opposite hypothetical of a person who had directed that all efforts be 
expended to prolong her life but who subsequently suffers “unremitting, 
unremediable pain and distress,” while incompetent, toward the end of her 
terminal illness). 
231 See generally Wendland, 28 P.3d at 174. The court rejected subjective 
proof of Robert’s best interest, despite the fact that the best interest standard is 
only applied when there is no objective proof of the patient’s wishes. Id. 
(stating that Rose had “no basis for such a finding other than her own 
subjective judgment that the conservatee did not enjoy a satisfactory quality of 
life and legally insufficient evidence to the effect that he would have wished to 
die”). 
232 Id. at 172. In effect, the court reset the standard to the degree of the 
old section 2355 prior to In re Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840 (Ct. App. 1988), 
only without any best interest standard at all.  
233 Wendland, 28 P.3d at 174 (noting that the decision “threatens the 
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favors the state’s interests in preserving life over the individual’s 
interests to choose between life and forgoing treatment. As such, 
the court’s decision fails to honor the autonomy it admits the 
statute sought to enhance.234 
D. The Court Erred as to the Appropriate Standard of Proof 
There are various approaches to the issue of safeguards for 
decision making for incompetent patients. Such approaches 
include different standards of proof,235 family health care 
decisions acts236 and alternative ways to view the needs of 
incompetent patients.237 These approaches share with Wendland 
the common element of indirectly addressing issues related to a 
due process analysis: the rights and interests of the individuals, 
the interests of the state and procedural safeguards.238 
Despite language relating to individual rights balanced against 
the state’s interest, Wendland never fully addresses the issue of 
                                                          
conservatee’s fundamental rights to privacy and life”). 
234 Id. at 161, 168. 
235 Id. at 169-70 (discussing the use of the clear and convincing evidence 
standard when fundamental rights are implicated). 
236 See, e.g., Hamann, supra note 205 (arguing that families had always 
been the locus of medical decisions for incompetent patients until the advent of 
medical technology, and that returning the decisions to families is 
appropriate). See also A.B. A6315, 2003-2004 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2003) 
(proposing the Family Healthcare Decisions Act), at http://www.assembly. 
state.ny.us/leg/?bn=A06315&sh=t. 
237 See, e.g., Dresser, supra note 181, at 627-30 (arguing that competent 
persons do not have a right to make advance choices that lead to serious 
harms); see also Nelson & Cranford, supra note 113, at 447-48 (arguing that, 
contrary to the opinions judges tend to hold that patients in PVS have a greater 
interest in having treatment withdrawn than those who are minimally 
conscious, patients in the minimally conscious state have a greater need to 
avoid the pain and humiliation of continued treatment because they may be 
able to perceive such problems). 
238 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). For state interests in 
cases involving withdrawal of medical care, see In re Grant, 747 P.2d 445 
(finding four state interests that might weigh against termination of treatment: 
preservation of life, protection of “innocent third parties,” suicide prevention, 
and maintaining the integrity of the medical profession). 
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due process.239 Instead, the court implicitly stated that due 
process in the case of a fundamental right to life requires a higher 
standard of proof than is normally required for civil matters as a 
safeguard against erroneous deprivation of a fundamental right.240 
The disadvantage of this approach in the case of refusal of 
medical care for incompetent patients is that avoiding the risk of 
violating the fundamental right to life creates an equal risk of 
violating the fundamental right to refuse medical care.241 In such 
cases, the risk of error will always be borne by the patient. As 
such, this issue is different from many other due process 
situations, where the purpose of higher standards of proof and 
increased procedural safeguards is to transfer the risk of error 
                                                          
239 Wendland, 28 P.3d at 160. 
240 Id. at 169. 
The function of a standard of proof is to instruct the fact finder 
concerning the degree of confidence our society deems necessary in 
the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of 
adjudication, to allocate the risk of error between the litigants and to 
indicate the relative importance attached to the ultimate decision. 
Id. (emphasis added). While the court mentions the allocation of the risk 
between the litigants, it assumed that the litigants here are the state and the 
conservator rather than the conflicting rights of the patient and concentrated 
instead on the relative importance it attached to the ultimate decision. Id. 
241 Id. at 160. See In re Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840 (Ct. App. 1988) 
(noting that the state’s interest is in protecting the patient’s right to have 
appropriate decisions made on his behalf and further noting that “[t]he 
problem is not to preserve life under all circumstances but to make the right 
decisions. A conclusive presumption in favor of continuing treatment 
impermissibly burdens a person’s right to make the other choice”). According 
to Wendland, the right to refuse medical treatment survives incapacity only “if 
exercised while competent pursuant to a law giving that act lasting validity.” 
Wendland, 28 P.3d at 160. In that determination, the court confused the 
survival of the right with procedural safeguards to determine the validity of the 
choice made in exercising the right. The court, in essence, converted advance 
directives into a new form of statute of frauds with a choice to receive all 
medical treatment as the default in the absence of compelling evidence (usually 
written) to overcome the default. Id. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1422 (7th 
ed. 1999) (defining “statute of frauds” as a statute “designed to prevent fraud 
and perjury by requiring certain contracts to be in writing and signed by the 
party to be charged”). 
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from the individual to the state.242 
The preponderance of the evidence standard, on the other 
hand, results in a roughly equal allocation of the risk of error 
between litigants.243 Such a standard creates a “fair balance” 
between conflicting interests.244 Other standards, by design, favor 
the interests of one side.245 Preponderance of the evidence is the 
standard applied “most frequently in litigation between private 
parties in every State.”246 The preponderance of the evidence may 
be considered insufficient if the majority of jurisdictions have 
adopted a stricter burden of proof.247 Higher standards of proof 
may be required when the competing interests are those of an 
individual and the state.248 The Supreme Court, however, 
recognizes a distinction between those proceedings and those in 
                                                          
242 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 755, 760 (1982) (refusing to apply 
the preponderance of the evidence standard for fact findings in proceedings to 
terminate parental rights, since the interests of the parents and the child are not 
in conflict with each other prior to a finding of parental neglect but are instead 
in conflict with the interests of the state). 
243 Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286-87 (1991) (applying the 
preponderance of the evidence standard in Chapter 11 reorganization 
proceedings in order to balance the conflicting interests of the creditor in 
recovering full payment and the debtor’s interest in a fresh start). 
244 Id. at 287. 
245 Herman & Maclean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 390 (1983) (noting 
that other standards “express[] a preference for one side’s interests” and 
applying the preponderance of the evidence standard in a class action suit 
seeking recovery for violations of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange 
Act, in order to balance defendants’ risk of “opprobrium that may result from 
a finding of fraudulent conduct” with the plaintiff’s risk of inability to recover 
under the act). 
246 Rivera v. Minnich, 483 U.S. 574, 577 (1987) (applying the 
preponderance of the evidence standard in paternity proceedings in order to 
balance the conflicting rights of the individuals involved, as distinct from 
balancing the rights of an individual against the interests of the state). 
247 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968) (noting that adherence 
to a standard by the majority of jurisdictions reflects “a profound judgment 
about the way in which law should be enforced and justice administered”). 
California, however, is one of only five states to require clear and convincing 
evidence in treatment termination decisions for incompetent patients. See 
supra Part I.B. 
248 Minnich, 483 U.S at 581. 
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which risks of an adverse ruling for private individuals exist 
regardless of the ultimate outcome of the case.249 In such cases, 
the “equipoise of the private interests that are at stake . . . 
supports the conclusion that the standard of proof normally 
applied in private litigation is also appropriate for these cases.”250 
Standards of proof are designed to protect against the risk of 
error in the majority of cases, rather than the “rare 
exceptions.”251 In addition, practical considerations may affect 
the choice of a constitutionally based burden of proof.252 That is, 
imposing a burden that cannot be met erects an “unreasonable 
barrier,”253 and it may be appropriate to use lower standards of 
proof when evidentiary problems could arise using a higher 
standard.254 In addition, “professional review” is sufficient to 
mitigate risks created by lower standards of proof.255 
In Wendland, Rose’s decision to withdraw nutrition and 
                                                          
249 Id. 
250 Id. 
251 See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344 (1976) (stating that 
“procedural due process rules are shaped by the risk of error inherent in the 
truthfinding process as applied to the generality of cases, not the rare 
exceptions”); supra note 219 (arguing that there is no reason to assume that a 
family member seeking to terminate medical treatment for an incompetent 
relative is doing so out of inappropriate motives). 
252 See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 430 (1979) (allowing a lower 
standard of proof for civil commitment of minors since “[p]sychiatric 
diagnosis . . . is to a large extent based on medical ‘impressions’ drawn from 
subjective analysis and filtered through the experience of the diagnostician”). 
253 Id. at 432. 
254 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982) (refusing to require 
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt in parental rights termination proceedings 
because of evidentiary problems); see also Addington, 441 U.S. 427-31 
(refusing to require evidence beyond a reasonable doubt in civil commitment 
proceedings because of a question as to whether a state could ever meet such a 
high standard and because of the inherent lack of certainty in diagnosis); supra 
Part III.B (arguing that Wendland requires a level of proof that can rarely be 
met). 
255 Addington, 441 U.S. at 428-29 (noting that “layers of professional 
review and observation of the patient’s condition, and the concern of family 
and friends generally will provide continuous opportunities for an erroneous 
commitment to be corrected”). 
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hydration met all of the requirements of due process, and should 
have been honored by the court. Rose based her decision on what 
she believed Robert would have wanted, considering his values, 
beliefs and statements about medical care.256 Her evidence was 
more than sufficient to show by a preponderance of the evidence 
that Robert would have wanted his treatment discontinued,257 and 
a preponderance of the evidence is all that should have been 
required.258 The family members who supported her decision had 
demonstrated the strongest emotional ties to Robert, while those 
opposed were estranged from him.259 His physician, the 
institutional ethics committee, his guardian ad litem and the 
county patient ombudsman all supported the decision.260 Thus, 
                                                          
256 In re Wendland, 28 P.3d 151, 174 (Cal. 2001) (recognizing that “[t]he 
trial court . . . found by clear and convincing evidence that [Rose] had acted 
‘in good faith, based on medical evidence and after consideration of the 
conservatee’s best interests, including his likely wishes, based on his previous 
statements’”). See supra Part II.A (describing Robert’s statements to Rose and 
the support she received from the medical hierarchy). 
257 See supra text accompanying notes 97-103 (describing Robert’s 
statements). In addition, Rose was Robert’s wife and presumptively knew his 
wishes and values better than anyone else. See Hamann, supra note 205, at 
165. Hamann states that 
what is unclear to the judge, who is a stranger, may be obvious to a 
family member who understands the person’s attitudes towards 
medical care and general view of life and the world. The family 
knows “the motives and considerations that would control the 
patient’s medical decisions.” There is a special bond between family 
members based on their shared experience that allows them to 
understand each other much better than those outside the family 
understand them. Nonetheless, this knowledge is often intuitive, 
causing difficulties when family members attempt to translate this 
knowledge into evidence to be presented at a hearing. 
 Id. (citations omitted). 
258 See supra notes 240-55 and accompanying text (discussing the 
purposes for different standards of proof and concluding that clear and 
convincing evidence is neither required nor desirable to effectuate a patient’s 
wishes). 
259 See supra note 113 and accompanying text (describing Robert’s 
relationship with his family). 
260 Wendland, 28 P.3d. at 155-56 (acknowledging such support but 
choosing to downplay the support of the guardian ad litum by referring only to 
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Rose met the burden that is appropriate in such cases and Robert 
had the safeguard of multiple layers of professional review.261 
The Wendland court, however, misperceived its role and set a 
standard designed to allow for withdrawal of treatment only when 
there is little, if any, doubt that the decision is precisely what the 
patient would have chosen.262 Such exactitude is not required by 
due process,263 and the attempt to achieve it violates the very 
autonomy on which the court based the standard.264 This attempt 
to honor autonomy has the contradictory result that patients who 
would have refused treatment no longer have the right to have 
their family assert that choice on their behalf. 
E. Recommendations to the Legislature 
California’s legislature must respond to Wendland to protect 
incompetent patients from receiving care they likely would have 
refused.265 The legislature should amend the HCDA to specify 
                                                          
Rose “for brevity’s sake”); see also In re Wendland, 93 Cal. Rptr. 550, 555 
(Ct. App. 2000). 
261 See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432 (relying on professional 
review to decrease the possibility of erroneous decisions). 
262 See Wendland, 28 P.3d at 172 (noting that the purpose of requiring 
clear statements is to effectuate the wishes of the patient). 
263 See Hamann, supra note 205, at 146-47 (noting that courts often refuse 
to discontinue medical treatment because of the risk of error, but that absolute 
certainty is not required by the law). 
264 Wendland, 28 P.3d at 168. 
265 See supra note 196 (citing sources noting that studies show that 
patients would choose to refuse treatment more often than their surrogates 
would refuse it for them). In amending the act, the legislature should address 
the areas of decision making that satisfy due process concerns but that keep 
such cases out of court. While there are currently procedural safeguards in 
place in California, many of those safeguards are optional or apply only in 
limited circumstances. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 4659 (Deering 2001) 
(prohibiting persons with certain conflicts of interest from serving as agents 
under a power of attorney for health care or acting as surrogates); CAL. PROB. 
CODE § 4674 (Deering 2001) (prohibiting persons with certain conflicts of 
interest from serving as witnesses to written advance directives); CAL. PROB. 
CODE § 4675 (Deering 2001) (requiring the signature of a patient advocate or 
ombudsman to written advance directives executed by patients in skilled 
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that, absent proof to the contrary, the family is the basic unit 
within which health care decisions should be made.266 The 
legislature should specify a process for selecting surrogates for 
patients who have not appointed surrogates and give validity to 
the informal decision-making process that is in place in 
California.267 
It should be made clear that the same process applies to all 
types of decisions, including the refusal of life-sustaining medical 
treatment for minimally conscious patients. Section 2355, 
providing for the use of the patient’s prior instructions and 
wishes and values, to the extent known, should be reaffirmed.268 
Amendments to section 2355 could include guidance for the 
                                                          
nursing facilities); CAL. PROB. CODE § 4677 (Deering 2001) (prohibiting 
health care providers, insurers, etc., from requiring or prohibiting the 
execution of advance health care directives as a condition for providing service 
or coverage); CAL. PROB. CODE § 4697 (Deering 2001) (automatically 
revoking the designation of a spouse as agent to make health care decisions on 
the dissolution or annulment of the marriage). Nothing in the Probate Code 
provides for physician or ethics committee review of decisions to refuse 
treatment on behalf of incompetent patients. See generally CAL. PROB. CODE 
§§ 4600-4805 (constituting the state’s Health Care Decisions Law).  
266 Hamann, supra note 205, at 169 (arguing that a “rebuttable 
presumption that family members act in the person’s best interest allows the 
rare cases involving abuse to be litigated”); accord Nancy K. Rhoden, 
Litigating Life and Death, 102 HARV. L. REV. 375 (1988); HILDE 
LINDEMANN NELSON & JAMES LINDEMANN NELSON, THE PATIENT IN THE 
FAMILY 6-25 (1995) (describing the evolution of the participation of families 
in the medical care of family members). 
267  Health Care Decisions Act: Hearing on A.B. 891 Before the Senate 
Rules Comm., 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. (Cal. Aug. 26, 1999). See also Herald, 
supra note 176, at 214 (arguing that the “default position” in the absence of a 
patient directive should be to honor the decisions of close family members and 
life partners). Alternatively, the legislature could require a consensus-based 
model. Thomas L. Hafemeister, End-of-Life Decision Making, Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence, and Preventive Law: Hierarchical v. Consensus-Based 
Decision-Making Model, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 329 (1999) (arguing that a 
consensus of family, the patient and health care providers in end-of-life 
decision making would respect the intent and needs of the patient while also 
preserving family relationships and reducing litigation). 
268 See generally CAL. PROB. CODE § 2355 (Deering 2001). 
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determination of a patient’s best interests.269 The legislature 
should specifically recognize advance directives and health care 
proxies as merely an opportunity for those few who desire to 
control their future treatment or identify a specific decision 
maker to do so. This schema would respect the choice of the 
majority who want their family to make decisions for them, and 
also protect those for whom this is not the best choice.270 
Amendments to the HCDA could mandate safeguards to 
prevent decisions made with suspect motives.271 Such safeguards 
                                                          
269 See, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985) (stating that 
treatment may be withdrawn without any evidence of the patient’s wishes 
when the patient is in “recurring unavoidable and severe pain”). Best interests 
considerations could include the “relief of suffering, the preservation or 
restoration of functioning and the . . . extent of life sustained.” Boozang, 
supra note 161, at 581. Other considerations could include: 
Patient’s present level of physical, sensory, emotional, and cognitive 
functioning . . . the degree of humiliation, dependence, and loss of 
dignity probably resulting from the condition and treatment; the life 
expectancy and prognosis for recovery with and without treatment; 
the various treatment options; and the risks, side effects, and benefits 
of each of those options. 
Div. of Family Serv. v. Carroll, No. CN00-09299, 2000 WL 33324536, at * 
12 (Del. Fam. Ct. Sept. 19, 2000). Some commentators have proposed that 
the family’s interests should also be considered. See, e.g., Fentiman, supra 
note 194. Many people factor such considerations into their own decisions for 
themselves. Channick, supra note 195, at 639. One pair of commentators 
suggests that a best interests analysis should ask the following question: 
Does this woman, as she is now, experience something good when 
her hair is brushed or when she sits in the sunlight, when she tastes 
split-pea soup or feels the caress of a nurse’s hand—and is this of 
sufficient value to her to count as a reason to go on? 
LINDEMANN NELSON & LINDEMANN NELSON, supra note 266, at 89. 
270 Provision already exists for those who wish to prevent participation in 
decisions by certain people. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 4715 (Deering 2001) 
(providing for the patient’s disqualification of specific individuals from serving 
as surrogates). See supra note 230 and accompanying text (noting that most 
adults would choose to have family members make treatment decisions in the 
event of incapacity). 
271 But see Hamann, supra note 205, at 151-54 (arguing that “there is no 
evidence . . . that families are allowing financial concerns to override the best 
interests of the person when making medical care decisions”). 
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could include mandatory involvement of healthcare providers in 
assessing the motives of the decision maker,272 ethics committee 
involvement in assisting the parties to consider the issues in 
assessing motives,273 and mediation of disputes.274 Additionally, 
                                                          
272 See Boozang, supra note 161, at 554 (arguing that “[h]ealth care teams 
are well-attuned to such issues and have legal and ethical consultants as well as 
bioethics committees at their disposal for consultation in case of any question 
about the family’s motivation or decision”). In essence, this would simply be a 
variation on the ethical concept of informed consent, adding the requirement 
that surrogates express their reasons for the decisions they choose. See 
CLINICAL ETHICS, supra note 219, at 89-100 (discussing the concept of 
informed consent). To address the court’s concern about the basis for the 
decisions, the legislature should provide guidance for determining whether a 
surrogate is acting in good faith, and define what would constitute abuse of 
discretion. Other considerations may include “preservation or restoration of 
functioning, quality and extent of life sustained, satisfaction of present desires, 
opportunities for future satisfaction, and the possibility of developing or 
regaining the capacity for self-determination.” Deborah K. McKnight and 
Maureen Bellis, Foregoing Life-Sustaining Treatment for Adult, 
Developmentally Disabled, Public Wards: A Proposed Statute, 18 AM. J.L. & 
MED. 203, 210 (1992). For example, the legislature could require clinicians 
who receive requests from surrogates to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining 
treatment to “ensure that an accurate diagnosis and prognosis has been made, 
that the family is truly representing the patient interests, and that those patients 
without close family members or friends to act on their behalf are not 
abandoned.” Fentiman, supra note 194, at 856. For an example of legislation 
incorporating safeguards against inappropriate treatment refusals by 
surrogates, see N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2963, 2965, 2972 (2002) 
(requiring physicians to assess the capacity of the patient prior to accepting a 
surrogate’s decision to refuse to consent to the provision of cardiopulmonary 
resuscitation [CPR] in the event of cardiac and pulmonary arrest; limiting the 
circumstances under which the decision can be made; requiring a second 
physician’s concurrence that those circumstances exist; requiring witnesses to 
the decision; and providing for dispute resolution procedures prior to court 
intervention). For safeguards required by courts, see In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 
1109 (N.J. 1985) (requiring ombudsman approval for decisions to forgo 
treatment made on behalf of nursing home residents); In re Grant, 747 P.2d 
445 (Wash. 1987) (requiring that two physicians agree that the patient is in an 
advanced stage of a terminal and permanent illness). 
273 See Boozang, supra note 161, at 553 (noting that bioethics committees 
are available for consultation in case of “any question about the family’s 
motivation or decision”). 
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appointment of a guardian ad litem could be required for those 
cases in which the procedures fail to resolve a dispute.275 The 
legislature should provide that the role of the courts in disputes 
should be limited to ascertaining whether the procedural 
safeguards were met, and that the court should not substitute it’s 
own determination of the best decision when due process 
safeguards are in place.276 
CONCLUSION 
The Wendland court misapprehended the scope of its 
decision, the means necessary to honor autonomy, the usefulness 
of advance directives to mitigate the decision’s negative effects 
and the need to require clear and convincing evidence. The court 
failed to recognize that its perception of individual autonomy in 
the context of health care decisions for incompetent patients is 
out of sync with that of the majority of adults in this country. As 
a result, the court incorrectly balanced patients’ right to life and 
right to refuse medical treatment and violated the very autonomy 
it sought to protect. 
The California legislature must now respond and amend the 
HCDA to restore the role of those closest to the patient in the 
decision making process. The amendments should focus on the 
family as the proper locus for such decisions, make a clear 
statement that the preponderance of the evidence is sufficient, 
and rely on procedural safeguards to detect rare decisions made 
out of improper motives. Such a framework is consistent with the 
                                                          
274 See, e.g., Robert Gatter, Unnecessary Adversaries at the End of Life: 
Mediating End-of-Life Treatment Disputes to Prevent Erosion of Physician-
Patient Relationships, 79 B.U.L. REV. 1091 (1999) (discussing the use of 
mediation in medical decision making); see also Diane E. Hoffman, Mediating 
Life and Death Decisions, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 821 (1994). 
275 Herald, supra note 176, at 214 (arguing that independent attorneys can 
be appointed to stand up for the patient’s rights). 
276 See THOMAS L. HAFEMEISTER & PAULA L. HANNAFORD, RESOLVING 
DISPUTES OVER LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT app. B, at 125-29 (1996) 
(describing examples of state-mandated models for resolution of disagreements 
regarding medical decisions). 
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choices of most patients and would reduce the risk of error. 
 
